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THE CUBAN EXILE: A SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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A Dissertation Presented to the  
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## DEDICATION

To my beloved wife  
for her patience, understanding  
and invaluable assistance,  
and to my marvelous children  
for the many sacrifices they made

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PART I

FOCUS OF THE STUDY

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### The Behavioral Approach

The discipline of political science uses varied approaches to analyze political phenomena. Traditionally, political scientists directed their attention primarily toward political structures, legal codes, and constitutions. Today many feel that however sophisticated or primitive these may be, their underlying basis is man; thus it is the study of human behavior which will provide the key to an understanding of politics. These behavioralists, as they are called, view politics as the complete study of man. As Lucian Pye puts it, "Politics reflects at one and the same moment the full splendor and the pettiest meanness of man."<sup>1</sup>

Behavioralists came strongly into vogue essentially after World War II as a sort of protest movement against traditional approaches to political science. The trauma of the war undoubtedly had a great effect upon scholars. The Weimar Constitution of Germany, for instance, which had been viewed as the epitome of

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<sup>1</sup>Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 3.

democratic success, was now seen as an inadequate guide for a full understanding of German politics. The new behavioralists felt that "the political science which had gone before did not measure up as a producer of reliable political knowledge."<sup>2</sup>

The behavioral approach to the study of politics has now grown into a large, comprehensive, and scientific school of thought. One of its most noteworthy innovations has been a willingness to apply the techniques of the other social sciences in handling political questions. Traditional political scientists had been reluctant to involve themselves in interdisciplinary studies. "Political science is the discipline which has less readily utilized . . . psychological and anthropological techniques in dealing with social phenomena."<sup>3</sup> This analysis is no longer totally true; many political scientists now borrow heavily from their colleagues in related disciplines. Personality theories, political culture analysis, and studies of group dynamics, which were previously within the exclusive realms of psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, are now among the major concerns of political science.

The following political analysis of the Cuban

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<sup>2</sup>Alan C. Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 35.

<sup>3</sup>Richard Kluckhohn (ed.), Culture and Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 7.



exile community in Miami is interdisciplinary in approach and utilizes behavioral techniques. It will treat Cuban exile politics through group analysis. This approach has proven to be a valuable scholarly tool; since Arthur Bentley's groundbreaking work, The Process of American Government,<sup>4</sup> many political scientists have employed and developed it. David Truman, who has contributed much to the theory of group analysis, points out that "in all societies of any degree of complexity the individual is less affected directly by the society as a whole than differentially through various of its subdivisions or groups."<sup>5</sup>

Most analysts of group behavior agree that as the individual begins his socialization process, his most basic and important relationship with society is through the family. Soon after the individual has established his identity in relation to his family group, he begins to develop a notion of social complexity and becomes aware that his family is but one element of a larger group of people who share certain traits in common and who are somehow different from other groups of people. Milton Gordon states that "this sense of peoplehood is ethnicity [from the Greek word ethnos, meaning "people" or "nation"]. We shall refer to a

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<sup>4</sup>See Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

<sup>5</sup>David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), p. 15.

group with a shared feeling of peoplehood as an 'ethnic group.'"<sup>6</sup>

Gordon's main thesis is that ethnicity is one of the most vital elements of social organization. He feels that there is some essential element in human nature that demands ethnic identification--something that compels man "to merge his lonely individual identity in some ancestral group of fellows smaller by far than the nation."<sup>7</sup>

Due to its heterogeneity, the United States offers an excellent laboratory in which to consider Gordon's thesis. Ethnic influence has played a vital role here in many social and political questions. As background, some of the more important ethnic groups which have existed in the United States will be briefly considered.

#### Ethnic Influences in the United States

The American Indians represent the original American ethnic group. Because of the destruction of the major part of their population, however, Indian influence today is of minor importance. Only recently, due to the focus on civil rights in this country, has attention been directed towards the American Indian.

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<sup>6</sup>Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 24.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

Ever since the importation of Negro slaves began, and up until the present the Negroes' relationship to the Caucasian majority has proven to be one of the major problems facing American society.

Most of America's ethnic groups came from Europe. The early immigrants, the so-called "yankees," were of predominantly Anglo-Saxon stock. There were also great numbers of pioneers from several areas of northern Europe who were similar in physical characteristics and cultural traits to the Anglo-Saxons. The descendants of these Germans, Scandinavians, Englishmen, and other northern Europeans are still generally referred to as the "typical Americans." According to McDonagh and Richards, this group "often defines itself as white American Protestants, or in a slightly different definition as the Anglo-Saxons."<sup>8</sup>

The late 1880's witnessed the arrival of new ethnic groups. These peoples came from southern and eastern Europe and generally are referred to as "the later immigrants." Their language and culture, and often their physical traits, very clearly distinguished them from the "typical American," and their merger into the American milieu has furnished the social scientist with a veritable laboratory for scientific research.

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<sup>8</sup>Eugene McDonagh and Eugene Richards, Ethnic Relations in the U. S. (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1953), p. 46.

Aside from the European immigrant groups which make up the majority of today's American stock, there have also been significant waves in the post-war periods of immigrants from Mexico, the Orient, and most recently Puerto Rico.

#### The Refugee--A Special Case

An understanding of the heterogeneous character of the United States is not complete unless attention is given to a very special type of immigrant--the political refugee. These people, some of the most recent arrivals to the United States, have come from the areas in Europe overrun by Hitler and particularly from various nations overtaken by communism. Since World War II, more than sixteen million exiles have fled what they believed to be the "menace" of communism. It is within this particular group of immigrants that the present study finds its data. The small island of Cuba, one of the fifteen countries from which the major portion of communist refugees have come, ranks eighth in the total number of those who have fled its communist government. In May of 1971, it was estimated that over 650,000 Cubans had left their homeland: over 500,000 of these had come to the United States.<sup>9</sup>

It must be stressed that the refugee is not an

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<sup>9</sup>U.S. News and World Report, (May 31, 1971), p. 75.

ordinary immigrant. As Jacques Vernant says in The Refugee and the Post War Period,

Whereas the immigrant is usually free to choose the place he will go to, and in certain measure to go back to the place he came from, the refugee is not free. Whatever the combination of motives--political, religious or social--that prompted him to leave his country, the very circumstances of his departure obliged him to go not where he will, but where he can: and once he has left, he cannot return.<sup>10</sup>

Due, then, to the trauma of exile, the refugee faces a different and far more difficult pattern of adjustment to a new life than does the ordinary immigrant.

#### Ethnicity and Politics

At this point it is appropriate to indicate the specific relationship of ethnicity to politics.<sup>11</sup> A general maxim concerning political behavior is that most people depend upon associations and groups for the formulation and stability of their political beliefs. "One's own private political convictions are not so much one's own as they might seem or as one might wish them to be."<sup>12</sup> It has been indicated in the foregoing pages

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<sup>10</sup>Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post War Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 20.

<sup>11</sup>For a detailed discussion see Henry J. Tobias and Charles E. Woodhouse (eds.), Minorities and Politics (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969).

<sup>12</sup>Bernard R. Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 54.

that ethnic groups are among the most important associations to which many people belong. This can be readily evidenced in the political world by the phenomenon of ethnic bloc voting. Gordon states that "bloc voting on an ethnic basis influences voting patterns in a substantial fashion,"<sup>13</sup> and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee concur that one of the major influences on voting patterns is ethnic cleavage.<sup>14</sup>

Many examples can be cited of this effect of ethnicity. A dominant theme in American politics has been the distinction between the politics of the typical American, who represents the majority, and that of the so-called hyphenated American, who represents the minority. An integral part of American politics must be interpreted in light of the political behavior of Italo-American, Negro-American, German-American, and other such nationality groups. During the Republican era of American history, for example, the sons of German, Norwegian, and Swedish immigrants banded together to oppose the Yankee bosses who controlled the Republican Party.<sup>15</sup>

Another such example of the ethnic factor in

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<sup>13</sup>Gordon, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>14</sup>Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, op. cit., p. 54.

<sup>15</sup>Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), p. 82.

politics is the sharp differentiation of Southern politics from that of the rest of the country. This is said to be due to the absence of significant numbers of settlers from various European countries. The South is essentially a homogeneous area, with the exception of the Negro, who has been excluded from politics until recently, and it is made up of people from predominantly Anglo-Saxon backgrounds. According to Samuel Lubell, this lack of varied ethnic difference has caused politics in the South to suffer from stagnation, at least in the past.<sup>16</sup>

Many observers contend that the heavy Democratic setback of 1920 had some ethnic basis. Lubell says that the German-Americans were particularly influential in the Democratic Party's downfall. During the war, he notes, the United States had witnessed a hysterical movement aimed at eradicating everything German.

With the war's end, the German-Americans proceeded to settle old scores. When Harding was nominated, a German-language newspaper stressed that his father-in-law was of German stock and spoke German fluently. The German press drummed the theme that "A Vote for Harding is a Vote Against the Persecutions Suffered by German-Americans During the War."<sup>17</sup>

Throughout the history of the American political party system, ethnicity has been a major consideration in that, until recently, one of the most outstanding differences between the Republican and the Democratic

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

Parties was a sharp difference between the ethnic groups which each party represented. The Republicans were more sensitive to the aspirations of the "old immigrant" elements who settled largely on farms, whereas the Democrats turned more towards the "new immigrants" who crowded into the cities. While traces of this situation are still to be seen, for the most part "both major parties are now actively competing for the vote of the various minority elements."<sup>18</sup>

#### Ethnicity and the Era of Urban Awareness

Ethnicity has become particularly important as the United States has changed from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban nation. The urban explosion has attracted the attention of American social scientists: bibliographies of scholarly work devoted to it are extensive.<sup>19</sup> Varied types of urban experiments have been initiated, and institutes of urban studies have become commonplace on the nation's university campuses. Public as well as private funds and energies are being expended in an attempt to meet the challenge facing

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>19</sup>For further discussion on urban ethnic minorities see Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1959); Oscar Handlin, The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor Books, 1962); and Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).



America during this period, which can be called the "Era of Urban Awareness." This awareness springs essentially from the growing realization of the many and varied problems facing America's cities, one of which is the existence of large racial and ethnic minorities in urban areas. As Banfield and Wilson express it, "Ethnic and racial differences have been and still are basic to much of the conflict in the city."<sup>20</sup> Glazer and Moynihan have aimed to "show how deeply the pattern of ethnicity is impressed on the life of the city. Ethnicity is more than an influence on events: it is commonly the source of events."<sup>21</sup>

#### Miami: An Appropriate Case Study

Miami, Florida, one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the United States, offers an array of ethnic influences. Its single largest ethnic group is of northern European ancestry. There are, however, several important minority groups. The Negroes account for approximately one-eighth of the population of the metropolitan area. There is a large Jewish population, especially in Miami Beach. Adding to this ethnic pluralism is a sizable Cuban population, the majority of whom are refugees from the regime of

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<sup>20</sup>Edward Banfield and James Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 38.

<sup>21</sup>Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., p. 310.

Fidel Castro. It is impossible to cite exact figures on the number of Cubans in Miami, due to the lack of detailed statistics and to the fact that so many who initially settled outside of Miami have tended to make their way back to that city and establish residence there. Former Mayor Stephen P. Clark indicates that his figures put the Cuban population at approximately 350,000.<sup>22</sup> At least one-eighth of the metropolitan population and 26 per cent of Miami proper is Cuban.<sup>23</sup>

Very little social scientific research has been undertaken on the Miami Cuban community, whose size alone indicates its potential as a subject of investigation. It will be shown here that Miami, regardless of political conditions in Cuba, will for some time continue to be a center of Cuban influence, and that influence will eventually become an important element of Miami's political life. It is for these reasons that Miami offers an appropriate social milieu in which to undertake an ethnic group analysis.

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<sup>22</sup>U.S. News and World Report (May 31, 1971), p. 74.

<sup>23</sup>Center for Advanced International Studies, Psycho-Social Dynamics in Miami. A report prepared by the Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean of the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla., for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Miami: January, 1969), p. 5.

## CHAPTER II

### SCOPE AND METHOD

#### The Conceptual Framework

This study of the Cuban exile in Miami employs a definite framework, a screening device for selecting those variables from the environment which will be used. A conceptual framework is "a pattern that has some plausibility and can serve as a point of departure."<sup>1</sup> It is, in other words, a construction which determines how the events under investigation will be conceptualized.

The conceptual framework of this study begins with the hypothesis that Cuban exiles represent a potential political interest group in Miami/Florida politics. Several social scientific approaches are used to verify this hypothesis expecting that insights will be gained into Cuban exile political behavior and a Cuban ethnic profile can be formulated.

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<sup>1</sup>Eugene J. Meehan, The Foundations of Political Analysis: Empirical and Normative (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1971), p. 81. This work contains a detailed explanation of conceptual framework.

The framework for this study may be diagrammed as follows:

TABLE 1.--Outline of the conceptual framework:

Hypothesis of research	Approaches of the research	Expectations of research
The Cuban exile represents a potential political interest group in Miami/Florida politics.	Analysis of the possible political roles, of Cuban exiles in American politics, their general political culture traits, and their dispositions on specific socio-political topics.	The formulation of a "Cuban ethnic profile" which will facilitate insights into their future political behavior.

### The Hypothesis

It should be noted from the outset of this discussion that the hypothesis treats Cuban exiles as a "potential" interest group. Cubans, due to their non-citizen status, cannot now be said to compose an American political interest group in the same manner as do groups composed of American citizens. David Truman indicates that one of the determinants of political interest groups is that they gain access to decision points within the government. The degree of access that Cubans have to government is minimal, in that they have little formal involvement in the American political

process through suffrage or office-holding.<sup>2</sup>

A recent study points out that less than ten per cent of the Cubans who have come to the United States have become citizens.<sup>3</sup> Many Cubans have not as yet fulfilled the residency requirements for acquiring American citizenship, but many others have not, even though they might be eligible, applied for citizenship. Among those who are United States citizens, there is no clear sign of active interest in American politics. One-time Miami Mayor David Kennedy offers this assessment: "They're more worried now about survival, reestablishing themselves socially and economically. The political adjustment comes last. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

Exactly when and how this political adjustment will take place is difficult to assess. The University of Miami's study, Psycho-Social Dynamics, while it substantiates that Cubans have to date played a small role in Miami politics, points out that "this may well undergo rapid change, depending on such factors as age, The acculturation process and the desire to look upon Miami as a permanent home."<sup>5</sup> The study also indicates

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<sup>2</sup>Cubans do engage in political activities from time to time through such actions as protest marches and political rallies. These activities are discussed in full on page 159.

<sup>3</sup>Business Week, (May 1, 1971), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , p. 73.

that "some observers foresee a day when Cuban-born Miamians will be elected and appointed to various offices."<sup>6</sup> If Miami Cubans follow the adaptation pattern established by the long existing Cuban community in Key West (discussed at length in Chapter III), they will undoubtedly become a political force. The present study will attempt to substantiate the hypothesis that Cubans will become politically active in the United States in the future.

#### Approaches to the Study

Historical, sociological, and economic data not only furnish background for an understanding of the Cuban exiles' participation in the American political system, but are essential to it. An ethnic group's political exile cannot even begin to be analyzed without such data. In this sense, Part II of this research is not merely preparatory but integral to it. Once that background has been presented, a more rigorous analytical approach is employed. This begins with role analysis. The most basic role, that of membership in the political system, is dealt with in detail. Such questions are taken up as these: Are exiles inclined toward playing a role in the American political system? Is the political milieu within which they find themselves conducive to their playing an effective role in

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

Miami and Florida politics? Will their ethnic identity govern their political behavior?

Discussion of the potential political roles of Cubans will be followed by an analysis of pre-Castro political culture traits and those manifested by the exiles after arrival in Miami.

Finally, a dispositional analysis will close the investigation. Attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of Cuban exiles on specific socio-political topics will be thoroughly evaluated.

#### The Formulation of a Cuban Ethnic Political Profile

Working from the hypothesis that Cubans are an important potential element in Miami and Florida politics, this paper will attempt to formulate through the various analytical approaches mentioned above an ethnic political profile of the Cuban exile community in Miami. This profile will hopefully provide general indicators and perhaps even some specific clues as to their future political behavior.

#### The Study Group

The specific element of the Cuban exiles in Miami studied here is made up of Cubans who are presently working towards college or professional degrees or who already hold degrees. These educated groupings were chosen for two reasons. The first was that they represent what Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet refer to

as opinion leaders<sup>7</sup>; as such they have the greatest potential for exercising political leadership among Cubans in Miami.<sup>8</sup>

Another reason for choosing an educated elite was that the researcher was affiliated with the University of Miami while the research was undertaken, and the groups of Cubans who were most readily available for analysis were students and professionals associated with the University's educational programs.

The study group was composed of junior and senior high school students who were engaged in college preparatory programs; students who were engaged in undergraduate, graduate, or professional studies; and professionals or businessmen who hold college or university degrees. For purposes of cross tabulation and in-depth analysis, the participants were divided into the following categories: public high school students, private high school students, college students, graduate students, medical doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, engineers, and scientists. There was also a male-female categorization.

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<sup>7</sup>Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 49.

<sup>8</sup>See pp. 61-66 for a more detailed discussion of the importance which Cuban exiles place on education.



### The Methodology

The major portion of the research data was gathered through an extensive questionnaire, which was distributed in English and Spanish. A total of 620 questionnaires were completed by the study group. The results were computerized. The questions concentrated on social and political matters, although data of an economic, religious, and geographical character was also elicited.<sup>9</sup>

Approximately 290 questionnaires were administered either in classrooms or by telephone. Another 330 were completed by respondents who had received them in the mail. All respondents were encouraged to comment either verbally or in writing on any of the questions; a large percentage took advantage of this opportunity, and many made lengthy statements which were helpful in the qualitative analysis appearing throughout the study.

Aside from the hard data furnished by the questionnaires, valuable insights into the Cuban exile group in Miami were gained during the year and a half when the writer served as Assistant Coordinator of the Cuban American Culture Program for the University of Miami's Division of Continuing Education. Daily

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<sup>9</sup>See Appendix I for complete sample of questionnaire and its responses.

contact with members of the Cuban community provided a richer understanding of the matters considered in this study.

PART II

THE BACKGROUND

## CHAPTER III

### HISTORY OF HISPANIC INFLUENCE IN FLORIDA

Of the scant research that has been undertaken of the Cuban exile, practically none treats the historic role that Florida has played as a center of Hispanic influence. Yet many historical factors have influenced the patterns of adjustment evident in the present Cuban community of Miami, and these factors are worthy of consideration.

Kathryn Trimmer Abbey points out that "Florida first saw the light of day historically speaking as a part of the Hispanic world."<sup>1</sup> From the first day of Florida's discovery, when the area was christened "Pascua Florida" by her Spanish discoverer, Ponce de Leon, until the 1970's, Spanish influence has been present. Today on the streets of several Florida cities Spanish is spoken almost as frequently as English. Florida has always been what might be termed a "hybrid peninsula," in some periods with greater Spanish influence, in other periods with greater Anglo influence, but almost always with some intermingling of

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<sup>1</sup>Kathryn Trimmer Abbey, Florida: Land of Change (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 3.

both worlds.

The entire area of Florida did not come under United States dominion until 1821. After this date, the relationship of the peninsula to the other southern states of the United States was so strong that Spanish influence temporarily sank into relative oblivion. By the late 1800's, however, as more American settlers moved south into the peninsula and the area became more important to the nation, Americans (both North Americans and South Americans) began to recognize the important implications of the geographical proximity of Florida to her Latin neighbors. "It was realized that Florida, stretching like a long finger, was the last port of call as one went south and the first coming north."<sup>2</sup>

#### Florida: The Closest Refuge

The geographical proximity of Florida to the island of Cuba (less than 100 miles away) has placed Cuba in a position of paramount importance to inter-American relations. One important result of this proximity is that Florida has continually furnished Cubans with a convenient emergency exit from the perennially turbulent political situation of the isle. According to Dr. Luis Rodriguez Molina,

Traditionally the state of Florida has been a refuge and protection for Cuban patriots who were persecuted by tyrannical regimes . . . some

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

returned and others, those who created interests, remained, constituting those called Cuban-Americans, whose descendants have Spanish surnames, speak Spanish, and may even consider themselves Cubans, without ever having been in Cuba.<sup>3</sup>

Tradicionalmente el estado de la Florida ha sido refugio y amparo de patriotas Cubanos perseguidos por regimenes tiránicos ... unos regresaron y otros, los que crearon intereses, se quedaron, constituyendo los llamados Cubano-Americanos, cuyos descendientes llevan apellidos españoles, hablan castellano, y hasta muchos se consideran Cubanos, sin haber estado jamás en Cuba.

### The Early Exile Communities

The Cuban communities of Key West and Tampa preceded the one in Miami. These earlier communities seemed to adapt well to their new environment, yet nurtured great respect and love for the Hispanic culture and for their homeland, and were determined to pass this heritage on to their children.

### Los Cubanos de Cayo Hueso<sup>4</sup>

A few Cubans settled in Key West in the early 1800's as resentment began to grow towards the Spanish masters in Cuba. By the mid-1800's there was a sizable exodus from Cuba, and the Cuban population of Key West grew to the point that Key West became a crucial exile

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<sup>3</sup>Luis Rodriguez Molina, "La Universidad de Miami y la Preservación de la Cultura Cubana," Estudios y Ensayos, trans. by Patrick L. Gallagher, Anual II, Volumen III, Número 5 (Mérida, Yucatán, México: July-Sept., 1969), p. 49.

<sup>4</sup>Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher: Key West Cubans--a phrase frequently used by Key Westerners of Cuban ancestry to differentiate themselves from those they refer to as "Cubanos de Cuba" (Cubans from Cuba).

community dedicated to the liberation of Cuba from Spain.

The Key West residents, Latins as well as Conchs,<sup>5</sup> generally gave wholehearted support to the numerous filibustering missions which left United States shores to liberate Cuba. An example of the climate of opinion can be seen in the case of Narciso López, a former Colonel in the Spanish Army who was sympathetic to the demands of Cubans. López set sail for Cuba with an expedition of five hundred volunteers in 1850. After failing to liberate the island, he fled back to Key West with a Spanish vessel following in rapid pursuit. López reached the safety of Key West, where he was arrested by United States authorities, tried for violation of the neutrality laws, and then acquitted. "He and his party were lionized in Key West. All the best homes were open to them, and they were feted as heroes. . . ." <sup>6</sup>

In 1868 one of the most famous and influential Cuban revolutionaries, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, fled Cuba for Key West; and in the following year the wealthy cigar manufacturer, Vincente Martinez Ibor, moved his entire business to Key West. Key West now, more than

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<sup>5</sup>Nomenclature for early inhabitants of Anglo-Saxon and Celtic stock.

<sup>6</sup>Jefferson B. Browne, Key West, the Old and the New (St. Augustine: Record Company Publishers, 1912), p. 116.

ever, attracted large numbers of dissatisfied Cubans. Not only was it a center for exile and revolutionary fervor, but its cigar manufacturing offered to exiles the economic incentive of a secure livelihood. Neither this security nor the new sense of freedom which they enjoyed in the United States diminished their reverence for the homeland. The most important leaders of the Cuban revolutionary movement--José Martí, Máximo Gomez, and Antonio Maceo--depended greatly upon the exiled Cubans for financial support, and much of their time was spent in Key West. It was in Key West, incidentally, that some of Martí's most renowned poetry was written. According to Molina, "It was the Florida pines that inspired his beautiful piece of oratory on 'The New Pines.'"<sup>7</sup>

It seems clear that, had it not been for the dedication of the Key West Cubans to the revolution, the cause of liberation would have been greatly hindered, if not made impossible.

More and more clubs were formed for Cuban freedom, and every man, woman and child was enrolled. Sympathizers stood ready around the clock to go to Cuba to fight. Funds were raised. The New York Junta [committee]--international headquarters of the movement--depended largely on Key West for funds.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Molina, *op. cit.*, p. 50. Original: "Fueron los pinos de la Florida los que inspiraron su bella pieza oratoria sobre." Trans. by Patrick L. Gallagher.

<sup>8</sup>Louise V. White and Nora K. Smiley, History of Key West (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Great Outdoors Pub.



While it is evident that they remained patriotic towards Cuba, the adaptation of these thousands of uprooted people to their new way of life in the United States was rapid. They quickly became an intrinsic part of the Key West community. With the exception of their illegal involvement in filibustering, which appeared to receive at least the tacit approval of many Americans,<sup>9</sup> the Cubans were a respectable and law-abiding citizenry. According to the historian J. B. Browne, "A number of Cubans obtained various positions under the city, state and federal governments and acquitted themselves with credit."<sup>10</sup> To cite an example, in 1876 Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, son of the great Cuban patriot, was elected Mayor of Key West. Another indication of the merit of the Cubans is given by Smiley and White:

These people brought a seriousness of purpose coupled with a gait and relaxed way of life. Their tolerance and geniality has contributed greatly to the island's charm. What might have become a fairly straightlaced, blue-law, insular culture contraposed to a sophisticated, high-handed Southern shipping aristocracy is now a fusion of the grace and good manners of South Carolina, Virginia and Great Britain, the righteous intelligence of the

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Co., 1959), p. 56. For a detailed explanation of New York Junta: Infra, p. 30.

<sup>9</sup>Kathryn Trimmer Abbey discusses the involvement and support of North Americans in many filibustering missions. Among the many Americans involved was Napoleon Broward, Governor of Florida, who actually commanded several filibustering missions personally. See Abbey, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>10</sup>Browne, op. cit., p. 118.

cultured New Englander, and the passionate benevolent Latin temperament.<sup>11</sup>

### Key West Today

After the defeat of Spain, many Cubans in Key West returned to Cuba, yet for various reasons thousands remained, and today there is still a decided imprint of Cuban culture on the city. Even a brief visit to Key West acquaints the visitor with the influence of the Latin world. The visible signs of Latin culture--Spanish architecture, Spanish restaurants, and the Spanish language--are everywhere. Lengthy interviews which the writer conducted among Key West Cubans indicate that these cultural symbols are not superficial and that there still exist strong traces of Hispanicism among Key West's inhabitants of Cuban extraction. Many of the leaders of the community--e.g. several judges, the Superintendent of Public Schools, leading medical men, and well-to-do businessmen--are of Cuban ancestry. They consider themselves to be loyal Americans, and they actively participate in the American political process. Their temperament, their customs, and in most cases their language, since most are perfectly bilingual, mark them nonetheless as sons of Hispan̄ola.

One of the persons interviewed, a lady of approximately fifty-five years of age, spoke Spanish so

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<sup>11</sup>White and Smiley, op. cit., p. 55.

fluently that one could easily assume she had spent at least a portion of her life in Cuba. Actually, she had been in Cuba only once in her life, when she was three years old. Not only had this lady maintained a fluent speaking knowledge of the language of her parents, but her children and grandchildren also all spoke Spanish fluently.<sup>12</sup> The only difference noted in the Spanish spoken in Key West from that spoken in Cuba is that the Cayo Huesinos (Key West Cubans), probably due to the Conch influence, speak with much less emotion, less rapidly, and in a lower tone of voice. There are also several words which were used in Cuba in the 1800's and later fell into disuse there that are currently used in Key West Spanish.

The Key West Cuban community, like the other Cuban communities of Florida, offers perhaps one of the best examples in the history of United States immigration of the feasibility of cultural pluralism. The Cubans in Key West have shown that to be fully American does not mean that one has to be of Protestant, northern European stock nor that he has to embrace all the cultural values of this group.

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<sup>12</sup>Interview with the Secretary to the Principal at Mary Immaculate High School, Key West, May, 1968.

### The Tampa Cubans

Another example of cultural pluralism can be observed in the case of Tampa Cubans, whose presence in that area dates back to 1868. These Cubans, like their compatriots in Key West, fled from the repressive measures of the Spanish authorities.

As in Key West, the Cubans began to establish themselves economically in Tampa very soon after their arrival. Ignacio Ibor and Ignacio Haya, another cigar manufacturer, moved their factories from Key West to Tampa. Ibor bought a tract of land northeast of the village of Tampa, and he and Haya established a factory section of Tampa that is known today as Ibor City. This area is still a noted center of Florida's cigar industry. It has nationally known restaurants and bistros which make up Tampa's Latin Quarter. Ibor City "still is Spanish in language, custom and point of view."<sup>13</sup> An urban renewal program in 1970 in the Latin Quarter notably accentuates Spanish architectural design.

The story of the Tampa Cubans is almost identical to that of the Key West Cubans. Although they showed an ability to adapt to their new environment, they retained a warm patriotism for their native Cuba. The New York Junta, which was the most important exile

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<sup>13</sup>Jack Kofoed, The Florida Story (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960), p. 189.

revolutionary organization, maintained fifteen Cuban national clubs in Tampa throughout the revolutionary period. It was, in fact, in Ibor City that Jose Martí plotted the overthrow of the Spanish government in Cuba.

Patriots on the island awaited a Manifesto from Martí. He wrote it on a sheet of paper in January, 1895, rolled it in a Panetela cigar at the O'Halloran factory, and entrusted the message to Miguel Angel Duque de Estrada. When the gentleman passed through Cuba's Customs, he handed cigars to inspectors and chewed nonchalantly on the one which contained the Manifesto.<sup>14</sup>

After Cuba's liberation from Spain, many Tampa Cubans returned to Cuba; however, just as in the case of Key West, many thousands remained and became American citizens. Their influence on Tampa's social, economic, and political life has been marked and vital.

#### The Impact of Castro Exiles on Key West and Tampa

As was pointed out above, the political turbulence of Cuba throughout a major portion of her history has effected a rather steady stream of exiles seeking refuge in the United States. Until the establishment of Miami as one of Florida's major cities, most of these migrated to Tampa or Key West. Today, however, primarily because of the Castro exiles, Miami far surpasses the other cities as a center of Cuban influence.

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 231.

Nevertheless, some Castro exiles have made their way to Key West and Tampa. Interviews in both of the latter communities indicate that the newcomers fit readily into the existing Latin communities and that they tend to reinforce the Latin value system.<sup>15</sup>

#### Hispanic Influence in Miami

Although Miami today is a bilingual and bicultural city, it played practically no role as a center for Hispanic influence during the late 1800's and early 1900's. Miami was, in fact, little more than a fishing village in the late 1800's. In 1896 there were only 502 voters.<sup>16</sup> However, when the United States declared war on Spain, the vulnerability of Miami by virtue of its geographical proximity to Cuba was accentuated by the press and by the United States government. A city of a mere 1,500 inhabitants was then swelled by the arrival of 7,000 United States soldiers. Coastal guns were rushed to Miami, and the government concentrated efforts for defending this previously unimportant area

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<sup>15</sup>An example is the case of R. A. Menendez, a Castro exile who is now an American citizen and a member of the City Council in Key West. Councilman Menendez worked diligently with the University of Miami to arrange for the citizens of Key West a festival of folk music as part of the Cuban-American Culture Program of the University. Menendez, along with the other Castro exiles in Key West, is intent on providing the Cuban community with as much exposure to Cuban culture as possible in order to strengthen and revitalize the already existing cultural traits.

<sup>16</sup>Abbey, op. cit., p. 360.

from possible Spanish attack.

The first bridge to Miami Beach, Collins Bridge, was completed in 1913. This heralded the beginning of Miami's tourist boom. Latin American as well as North American tourists came to enjoy the newly-found vacation paradise. Latin influence gradually began to have an impact on Miami. One of the leading architects of the day, Patterson Misner, was responsible for introducing Spanish architecture to the city. He was so successful that he opened a factory in which carved doors, wrought iron decor, tile, and other motifs of Spanish architectural design were produced. Juan K. Trippe moved his company, Pan American Airways, from Key West to Miami in 1927, and air travel began to connect the two Americas. "Miami took Trippe and his high hopes for making the magic city the gateway to South America to her bosom."<sup>17</sup>

The years from 1933 to 1940 established Miami as a definite center of Cuban influence: exiles, fleeing the after-effects of the revolution against Gerardo Machado, began to choose Miami as their major place of residence. Another stream of Cubans came in the years from 1953 to 1959, as they fled the Batista regime. As the political situation fluctuated in Cuba, many Cubans returned, but many thousands chose to remain in Miami.

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<sup>17</sup>Helen Muir, Miami, U.S.A. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1953), p. 175.

The pre-Castro Cuban population of Miami was approximately 20,000.<sup>18</sup>

### Summary and Conclusions

The foregoing sketch of Latin influence throughout the history of Florida contains valuable implications for a study of Castro exiles in Miami.

Historically, Cubans who migrated to the United States were for the most part political exiles. The conditions under which they left their homeland were in many respects similar to those under which the Castro exiles left. It can be assumed, then, that the Castro exiles will experience at least some of the same patterns of adaptability to the new life in Florida as the earlier Cuban exiles had witnessed.

Florida has furnished throughout Cuba's history an important "escape hatch" for those discontent with the political climate of their homeland. Cuban history books, poetry, folktales, and songs are filled with accounts of the Florida Cuban communities. The Castro exiles, if they had not witnessed it personally, were at least partially aware of the Latin cultural traits and the geographical and climactic similarities between Cuba and southern Florida. This undoubtedly lessened

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<sup>18</sup> Center for Advanced International Studies, The Cuban Immigration, 1959-1960, and Its Effect on Dade County, Fla., a Report Prepared by the Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean of the University of Miami (Coral Gables, 1967), p. 1.



the trauma of leaving their homeland,<sup>19</sup> and somewhat facilitated their adaptation to a life in exile.

A last consideration is that the existence of pre-Castro communities in Florida undoubtedly cushioned somewhat the reaction of the North Americans to the influx of so many thousands of Castro exiles. The social and economic success of Cubans in Florida prior to Castro had set a favorable climate of opinion towards Cubans, and for the most part the Castro Cuban has not been hampered by any great degree of open prejudice as have many other minority groups throughout the history of United States immigration.<sup>20</sup>

Helen Muir says of Miami that "although it belongs to the United States and is the United States, it is also a tropical country."<sup>21</sup> Most Cuban exiles would paraphrase Miss Muir and say that Miami, although it belongs to the United States and is the United States, is also a little Cuba.

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<sup>19</sup> Many people interviewed by the writer pointed out the great importance of the tropical environment as a favorable factor of their adjustment process.

<sup>20</sup> Data gathered for this study show that only 5 per cent of those Cubans questioned feel that there is much overt prejudice against them.

<sup>21</sup> Muir, op. cit., p. 5.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CASTRO EXILE

An important and dramatic event of the post-World War II period has been the establishment of Fidel Castro's communist government in Cuba and the subsequent exodus of more than 650,000 Cubans. Over a half-million of these refugees have come to the United States. The foregoing pages have discussed pre-Castro exile groups; the Castro exiles are by far the largest single group ever to have fled Cuba. Because the exodus began over ten years ago and its numbers have grown so large, it can best be analyzed by considering its different stages. Each is distinguishable from the others primarily by three factors: (1) the political and economic status of the exiles, (2) the particular political climate in Cuba at the time of their departure, and (3) the means of transportation available to the exiles at the time they left their homeland.

#### The First Stage

When it became clear that Castro would seize power, there was an immediate departure from Cuba by the Batistianos, the economic and political elite openly affiliated with the government of Fulgencio

Batista. It is estimated that some 3,000 Cubans left the island in the early months of 1959.<sup>1</sup>

This group can be distinguished from later exiles in that it represents a rather normal phenomenon of Latin American politics. Due to the sharp cleavages among political groups in Latin America, it is considered "part of the game" in many countries for the "outs" to go into exile when their party is defeated.

#### The Second Stage

From mid-1959 through early 1960 came another type of exodus. These exiles, for the most part, were people from the economic elite of Cuba who would suffer from the reforms which were being enacted. Agrarian reform was one of Castro's first "pet" projects, and this second stage of exodus was composed heavily of the landed aristocracy. There were also some members of the middle class who left the island at this time because they were opposed on ideological grounds to Castro's emerging Marxist tendencies. They saw the leftist direction of the government and feared the socialist indoctrination of their children. This second group numbered approximately 7,000 people.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Laureano Batista, Political Sociology of the Cuban Exile, Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Miami (Miami: January, 1969), p. 18.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

### The Third Stage

In the latter part of 1960 and throughout 1961 it became increasingly clear that it was not only the economic and political elites that were leaving Cuba. People from many walks of life who feared the repressive and totalitarian tendencies of the Cuban government sought refuge in the United States and other countries, such as Venezuela, Spain, and Mexico. During the third stage, which lasted until the cancellation of flights to the United States in October of 1962, some 150,000 people left Cuba.<sup>3</sup> Included were scores of persons who had been among Castro's most noted supporters, yet now felt that he had betrayed the revolution.<sup>4</sup>

### The Fourth Stage

After Castro made it illegal for Cubans to leave for the United States, many began to find alternative routes to that destination. For those who were financially able, one way was to depart for another country and from there to seek entry to the United States. This was not only costly, but trying as well--the waiting period in the third country before the proper United States entry documents could be obtained was usually quite lengthy. Cubans who arrived in Miami

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>4</sup>For a complete discussion of former Castro followers who defected see Luis Manrara, Betrayal (Miami: The Truths About Cuba Committee, 1967).

directly from Cuba were considered to be refugees and were granted immediate entry. However, those who sought entry from a third country were considered aliens by the United States government, and therefore subject to all existing immigration restrictions. An account of Cubans seeking entry to the United States from Spain points out the following:

Once on Spanish soil, the Cuban is like another one of millions seeking an immigration visa to the land of "golden opportunities." Moreover, he has to pass a medical examination, have a good moral record, and be able to prove it by presenting a police certificate. He also must prove that the work he will do in the U.S. would not put a U.S. citizen out of work. If old, he must present affidavits from relatives established in the U.S. that they will not permit him to become a welfare case.<sup>5</sup>

Aside from the third country route, the only other means open to exiles during this period was to leave Cuba illegally. Thus began one of the most dramatic episodes of the history of the exile. The written accounts and the information gathered from exiles who left the island in small boats furnish considerable evidence that many Cubans found living in Castro's Cuba intolerable. The type and the poor condition of the vessels in which they undertook the perilous sea journey furnished dramatic commentary on their dissatisfaction under the Castro regime.<sup>6</sup> It is impossible to

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<sup>5</sup>Nixon Smiley, "Some Went to Spain," Tropic Magazine, IV, No. 25 (1970), p. 23.

<sup>6</sup>Several vessels used by exiles are kept on display at the Naval Base in Key West, Fla.

estimate accurately how many thousands of Cubans have attempted the voyage over the Florida Straits, now known to the Cuban exiles as the "Corredor de la Muerte."<sup>7</sup> It is known that many attempts have ended in disaster. The following is typical of stories commonly heard in exile groups.

On March 2, 1964, Vincente Mayans and his wife, along with 12 other adults and four children, left a deserted beach in the province of Oriente in a small craft destined for Jamaica. Due to the faulty condition of the vessel, after the party was but a few miles from the coast of Cuba the motor ceased to function and the boat was carried far out into the Caribbean Sea. On the 19th of March the vessel was found. Vincente Mayans, the only survivor, clung tightly to his dead wife's body, which he had been holding for two days. All of the other dead bodies were buried in the Caribbean Sea, and as Mayans recounts the story, "... Allí los esperaba una manada de tiburones que seguía al bote constantemente."<sup>8</sup>

Since the start of the Freedom Flights in November, 1965, the number of exiles fleeing Cuba by means of small boats has greatly decreased; but there is still a trickle of Cubans who feel that this is the only way for them to escape. During the first five and one-half months of 1970, ninety-two people managed to complete the dangerous journey. One of these trips was made in a makeshift inner-tube raft; four men started

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<sup>7</sup>Corridor of Death, trans. by Patrick L. Gallagher.

<sup>8</sup>Jose Jorge Vila and Guillermo Zalamea Arenas, Exilio (Miami: Editorial A.I.P. 1967), p. 93. Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher: "There awaited them a group of sharks which followed the boat constantly."

out, but only three survived.<sup>9</sup>

According to exiles who have made such trips in 1970, it is increasingly difficult to flee Cuba in small boats, due to the government's control of boats and the constant surveillance by Castro's forces.

#### The Fifth Stage

A decided change in Cuban policy occurred on September 28, 1965. Castro announced that anyone wishing to leave the island could leave through the small fishing village of Camarioca on the northern coast of Matanzas province. The departure arrangements were to be made by friends and relatives in the United States who could afford to hire boats for the trip. By November 30, a fleet of 4,993 refugees had traversed the Florida Straits.<sup>10</sup> They represented a largely middle and upper income group.

By November of 1965, due to Castro's new position of leniency, an agreement between the United States and Cuba was reached concerning the future exodus of dissatisfied Cubans. This heralded the beginning of the so-called "Freedom Flights" mentioned above. Washington anticipated that some 73,000 Cubans might leave. Castro talked in terms of 100,000 and later 150,000.

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<sup>9</sup>Frank Solar, "The Cuban Beat," Miami Herald, June 15, 1970, p. 361.

<sup>10</sup>Batista, op. cit., p. 24, quoting Captain William F. Cass, The Cuban Exodus, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June, 1966, p. 49.

Evidently, both sides underestimated the number of Cubans who desired to flee the Castro government. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert M. Sayre told Congress that Cuban refugees in the United States have applied for the evacuation of no fewer than 900,000 relatives--fully one-seventh of Cuba's population.<sup>11</sup> Two plane loads of Cubans a day began arriving in Miami five days a week. A total of 3,600 exiles a month were leaving Cuba via the Freedom Flights.<sup>12</sup>

During this fifth stage, still in process during the preparation of this research, thousands of Cubans from varied economic and occupational backgrounds have arrived in the United States. The United States Department of Health and Welfare figures show that from December, 1965, through August of 1971, 245,440 Cubans arrived by means of the airlift: 64.4 per cent of the arrivals are children, students, and housewives; approximately 8.3 per cent of the arrivals are from semi-skilled, service-farm or fishing occupations; 9 per cent of the arrivals are listed as skilled laborers; 11.3 per cent are in the clerical and sales occupation category; and 6 per cent are from managerial,

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<sup>11</sup>"Cuba, the Freedom Flood," Time, April 1, 1966, p. 34.

<sup>12</sup>"Flight from Cuba--Castro's Law is U.S. Game," U.S. News and World Report, May 31, 1971, p. 24.



professional, or semi-professional backgrounds.<sup>13</sup>

The difficulty encountered by Cubans wishing to leave on the Freedom Flights substantiates again the fact that the Cubans coming to the United States are not ordinary immigrants seeking a better life, but political exiles fleeing what to them is an intolerable system. In order to put some restraint on the numbers applying to leave Cuba, the Castro government initially required that every Cuban adult from every walk of life sign a five-year employment contract with the government. Signing the contract implied the renunciation of the right to leave Cuba for the duration of the contract. Those who refused to sign were to receive a penalty of the immediate loss of their jobs and would be refused jobs in any part of the country. In addition, their food ration cards would be revoked. There was also the probability that they would be assigned to forced manual labor without pay. This policy, however, was soon abandoned, due to the fact that so many Cubans refused to sign the document.

There are still many restrictions on those who wish to leave Cuba. Men of military age (17-45), children after their fifteenth birthday, and many professional and technical people find it difficult, if not impossible, to leave. Very few Negroes have come into

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<sup>13</sup> Paul Lane, "Cuban Refugee Program." A paper prepared by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Cuban Refugee Program, August 31, 1971, p. 1.

exile, but those who have indicate that the Castro government, since it has used equality of races as one of its propaganda devices, considers Negroes' leaving to be an embarrassment and therefore makes it extremely difficult.<sup>14</sup>

Once a person receives permission to leave, he frequently undergoes a great deal of harassment. Supporters of Castro label such persons "gusanos," a term literally meaning "worm." Those who have non-essential jobs are summarily fired. An official inventory must be made of all of their possessions, including cars, homes, and savings; and these must be turned over to the government. Frequently those preparing to leave Cuba must depend upon relatives and friends for their livelihood as they approach the time for departure. Everything but a few personal belongings must be turned over to the government. An elderly doctor who was interviewed for this study told of the help he had received from former patients in the weeks before departure from Cuba: one such patient accumulated and secretly gave the doctor a week's supply of rations. Had it not been for such generosity, the doctor might not have survived the waiting period prior to his departure since he had been ailing for some time.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>For full discussion see Batista, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

<sup>15</sup>Interview with Dr. Enrique Roca, April, 1970.

### Summary and Conclusions

The foregoing analysis indicates that the Cuban exile represents much more than a mere political or economic elite. The very early stages of the exodus were composed of the so-called "upper-crust" of Cuban society. However, from 1960 onwards the majority of the exiles represent a fairly good cross-section of middle class Cubans and even an impressive minority of people from the lower economic income groups of Cuba. The hardships which the majority of these people have faced both in preparing to leave Cuba and in facing a new life in exile should indicate that they are refugees, and not simply immigrants.

Many political scientists analyze attitudes. Most such investigations, however, have been aimed at the attitudes of persons or groups towards their own nation or political system. The exile is a stateless person, and as such presents a peculiar entity. His values and attitudes towards the homeland and towards his adopted country and new way of life should furnish the political scientist with interesting data. What influence, for instance, has the special situation of forced exile on a person's political attitudes towards the mother country and the host country? Can anything be seen in these attitudes which gives insight into the future political behavior of this special type of political being? Will Cubans, in fact, continue to be

special political entities, or will they become assimilated into the predominantly Anglo-American political value system? These are some of the questions which will be dealt with below in the in-depth analysis of the Cuban exile community.

First, however, attention must be turned briefly to pertinent demographic, social, and economic considerations as they relate to the present condition of the Cuban in exile. It must constantly be remembered that the exile is part of two worlds, and in order fully to appreciate this rather schizophrenic situation, we must consider the social milieu in which he finds himself in his present state of exile. For this reason such characteristics of the Cuban community as geographical distribution and housing, employment, business and labor, the professions, tourism, the crime rate, education, the arts, and exile publications are studied in the next section.

## CHAPTER V

### GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIAMI CUBAN COMMUNITY

#### Geographical Distribution and Housing

In Chapter II it was pointed out that the pre-Castro Cubans in Miami numbered approximately 20,000; there were, however, at this time no distinct areas of the city which could be called "Latin" sections or ghettos.

Prior to 1959, Miami had no Latin quarter, or dense concentration of Latin or Cuban families. Cubans in the Miami area before the Castro Revolution formed a sizable, generally middle-class population scattered throughout the area.<sup>1</sup>

As the Castro exiles began to arrive, however, a distinct pattern of geographical concentration of Cubans began to form. Aside from the very wealthy Cubans who fled during the first stages of the exile and took up residence in Miami Beach, Key Biscayne, and Coral Gables, most exiles settled in low-rent neighborhoods that were close to public transportation facilities. They lived mainly in areas near downtown Miami and in the southwestern section of the city.

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<sup>1</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . ,  
p. 22

In the early 1960's there was a problem of overcrowding. Due to Castro's curtailing of the exportation of one's assets, most Cubans arrived in Miami in dire economic condition. The traditional extended-family system to which most Latins adhere, however, provided a partial solution to the immediate and most drastic needs in that the greater percentage of refugees found relatives willing to "take them in" until jobs and housing could be arranged.

It was common during this period to find two or three related families living in quarters which were intended for only one-family occupancy.<sup>2</sup> Many predicted that conditions were ripe for the emergence of slum neighborhoods. A Cuban slum, however, never developed. In fact, areas that were previously economically stagnant, with a "run-down" appearance and declining property values soon became respectable neighborhoods with growing potential for small businesses and shops.

The short-term effect of the Cuban influx was not only to alter radically the occupancy of apartments and dwellings and stem the declining real estate values, but also to stem business stagnation in these areas.<sup>3</sup>

Although two-thirds of metropolitan Miami's Cuban population lives inside the city limits, there has been a tendency since the late 1960's among some

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<sup>2</sup>Center . . . , The Cuban Immigration, . . . , p. 89.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

Cubans to move to the more costly suburban areas. New housing developments, particularly in the suburbs south of the city, now have sizable Cuban populations. Many Cubans, as they find themselves in better economic conditions, prefer to live outside the congested areas of downtown Miami. There persists in these new areas, however, the tendency for Cubans to cluster in community groupings.<sup>4</sup>

Cuban exiles increasingly tend to buy homes. In 1965 W. P. Wilcox, the Director of the Federal Housing Administration, disclosed that an estimated twenty per cent of the home purchases in the Miami area insured by the Federal Housing Authority and 30 per cent of the re-sales after mortgage foreclosures involved Cubans.<sup>5</sup> In the 1970 survey used in this research, 56 per cent of 600 Cubans questioned lived in homes which they or their families owned.

The above data indicate that, as concerns housing, there is a definite upward mobility pattern among Cuban exiles. Cubans in the city have improved the low income neighborhoods in which they originally settled. When their means allow, they tend to buy rather than rent homes; and there are now indications

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<sup>4</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , p. 16.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., quoting a letter from Wilcox of October 12, 1966, to the Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean of the University of Miami.

of Cuban communities growing in the more expensive suburban areas.

### Employment Conditions

The unemployment rate among exiles during 1959 and 1960 was, as might be expected, extremely high. At times it reached 77 per cent. By 1961, however, this figure had fallen to about 15 per cent, despite the great increase in the number of refugees arriving in Miami. By December of 1965, less than five per cent of the total Cuban population was unemployed.<sup>6</sup> These figures are particularly noteworthy when it is considered that in 1965 approximately five per cent of the exiles were over sixty-five year old.<sup>7</sup>

The number of Cubans in Miami receiving welfare presents a similarly favorable picture. In 1960 as many as 50 per cent of the exiles were receiving welfare benefits from the United States government; by the end of 1966 only ten per cent received welfare. The rate of unemployment among Cubans is also low; it was reported in U.S. News and World Report in October of 1967 that the unemployment figure had dropped six per cent lower than the previous year--"No more than four per cent of the Cuban refugees are on relief at any one time, and most of them are old and sick."<sup>8</sup> Fortune

<sup>6</sup>Batista, op. cit., p. 113.      <sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. News and World Report, October, 1967, p. 196.



Magazine says:

In most communities where Cubans have settled welfare officials have noted with astonishment their powerful urge to stay off relief rolls whenever jobs are available--and with even more astonishment have noted the effort that some Cubans made to pay back welfare money that they had received.<sup>9</sup>

The article goes on to quote Robert Frutkoff, a management expert for the New York State Employment Service, as saying that "Cubans are a highly motivated group. We found, for example, that they would prefer to take any type of job rather than apply for welfare."<sup>10</sup>

#### Cuban Businesses

Many examples of business success can be cited among the Cuban exiles. "Some Cuban enterprises which started on shoestrings only a few years ago have grown into million-dollar-a-year businesses."<sup>11</sup> One such example is International Boats. In 1963 several Castro refugees pooled what little capital they could scrape together and began building fiber-glass boats in Hialeah, a city adjacent to Miami. By 1966, the company grossed \$1,500,000 and employed fifty persons.<sup>12</sup> Another enterprise of which the exiles are proud is the Bacardi Rum Company. The central office is now located

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<sup>9</sup>Tom Alexander, "Those Amazing Cubans," Fortune, October, 1966, p. 149.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>"A Cuban Success Story," U.S. News and World Report, March 20, 1967, p. 104.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

in impressive office buildings on Biscayne Boulevard in Miami.

There are an estimated 3,000 small businesses owned by Cubans.<sup>13</sup> One of the striving small industries is tobacco; Miami has now surpassed Tampa in the production of hand-rolled cigars. There are nearly a dozen small cigar companies in Cuban hands in the area.<sup>14</sup>

Aside from insuring their own economic stability and independence, the Cubans apparently have also been of help to the economic structure of Miami. According to U.S. News and World Report, "Most Miami businessmen will tell you that the refugees saved department stores and small businesses in downtown Miami, which were losing trade to the suburbs in 1960 when the refugee flow got big."<sup>15</sup> Occasionally there have appeared in the newspapers of Miami statements by readers who contend that the influx of Cubans has been detrimental to the city's economy. One such comment is that Cubans, because they work for lower wages, have replaced many Americans in jobs. This charge, however, has not been substantiated. John F. Thomas, Director of the Cuban Refugee Program, conducted a survey through employment

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<sup>13</sup>Vila and Zalamea Arenas, op. cit., p. 165.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>15</sup>U.S. News and World Report, March 20, 1967, p. 106.

agencies and civic leaders aiming to find Miami residents who had been fired from their jobs to make room for refugees. In Thomas' study, not one American was found who claimed that he had been replaced by a Cuban.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps one reason why Thomas' survey turned out as it did is that many refugees took on positions of a professional nature which at the time needed to be filled.

#### Cuban Professionals

It was reported in U.S. News and World Report that "in the professions, Cubans are filling many posts for which there are not enough qualified Americans."<sup>17</sup> There were, as of March, 1967, 2,500 Cuban teachers in United States schools, colleges, and universities. Almost 2,000 Cuban physicians are working in United States hospitals. There are also many engineers, architects, and scientists now practicing their professions in this country.<sup>18</sup>

Exile lawyers are one professional group whose former training has been of no practical value in the United States. Due to the different legal system in Cuba, very few lawyers have been able to reestablish

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<sup>16</sup>Center . . . , The Cuban Immigration . . . , p. 97.

<sup>17</sup>U.S. News and World Report, March 20, 1967, p. 106.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

themselves in the legal profession in this country. It is still not uncommon to find men who successfully practiced law in Cuba working in factories, washing cars, or scrubbing floors in Miami hotels.<sup>19</sup>

#### Cuban Labor

Among the exiles who left Cuba in 1962, 1963, and 1964, and particularly among those who have come on the Freedom Flights since 1965, many are skilled or semi-skilled laborers, farmers and fishermen.<sup>20</sup> These Cubans, along with some professionals who have been unsuccessful in relocating in a professional capacity, make up a large portion of Miami's labor force. There are some 7,000 Cubans working in the hotel industry, most of whom perform service functions. Approximately 85 per cent of the seamstresses working in dress factories in Miami are Cuban. Robert Gladnick, President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, states the following:

The Cuban woman, and in general the Latin-American woman, has contributed extraordinarily to the sewing industry of Metropolitan Miami having become a strong source of income for the local economy, and has manifested that if there is any future for that sector of the economy, it is uniquely and exclusively due to the presence of Cuban exile women.

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<sup>19</sup>Interview with the President of the Colegio Nacional de Abogados en el Exilio (National College of Lawyers in Exile), October, 1969.

<sup>20</sup>Supra, p. 39, footnote 4.

La mujer cubana, y en general la Latinoamericana, ha contribuido en forma extraordinaria a que la industria de la aguja de Miami Metropolitano se haya convertido en importante fuente en ingresos para la economía local, y manifestado que si existe algun futuro para ese renglón económico se debe única y exclusivamente a la presencia de las exiladas cubanas.<sup>21</sup>

### Tourism

Cuban exiles have also tended to boost Miami's tourist industry. Lew Price, Director of Tourism and Publicity for Metropolitan Miami, credits Cuban restaurants and night clubs as being some of Miami's most popular. Cubans have brought to Miami a truly cosmopolitan atmosphere, according to Price; he says that "from the point of view of tourism, certain sectors in which the Cuban establishments are predominant are now for Miami what Chinatown is for San Francisco."<sup>22</sup> Price also points out that tourists from Latin America feel at home in Miami, since here they find all that they have been accustomed to in their countries, and proceeds to say that "the Cuban acts as interpreter, serves customers in the principal establishments of the area, has become a guide, and in one word, a bridge between the Spanish-Americans and the United States

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<sup>21</sup>Vila and Zalamea Arenas, op. cit., p. 143. Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 133. Original: "Desde el punto de vista turístico, ciertos sectores de nuestra ciudad en que predominan los establecimientos cubanos son ahora para Miami lo que el Barrio Chino es para San Francisco." Translation from Spanish by Patrick L. Gallagher.

citizens."<sup>23</sup>

It may be concluded that Cuban exiles in a relatively short period of time are making economic advance in Miami. They have become financially stable and are, according to many observers, an asset to the community. In the words of former Vice-President H. Humphrey, "The Cuban exiles have not hurt the country; actually, they have bettered it."<sup>24</sup>

#### Crime Rate

During the early years of exile, one of the factors often cited about Cuban refugees was the low crime rate within their community. Most observers agreed that Cubans were to be praised for their respect for law and order. Circuit Court Judge Ray of Miami spoke of the refugees in the following manner:

The Cuban refugees have, for the most part, behaved in exemplary fashion. They have shown dignity, patience and initiative. . . . The Cubans appear to have strong respect for law and family, and as such have not created a law enforcement problem.<sup>25</sup>

The University of Miami's Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean pointed out in one study that the average record of arrests in 1963, 1964 and 1965 was

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 134. Original: "El cubano actúa de intérprete, atiende en los principales comercios de la región, se ha convertido en guía, y, en una palabra, en puente entre el visitante Iberoamericano y los Estadounidenses." Translation from Spanish by Patrick L. Gallagher.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>25</sup>Batista, op. cit., p. 93.

much lower for Cubans than for any other racial or ethnic group in the city. Cuban females had a particularly exemplary record, and the rate of juvenile delinquency among Cuban youths was also lower than among American or any other ethnic youth groups.<sup>26</sup>

The following table shows a three-year comparison of arrest rates:

TABLE 2.--Rates of arrests of Miami Cuban population as compared with the Miami white American population\*

Year	Cuban	White American
1963	1.8%	7.8%
1964	1.7	8.6
1965	1.4	8.9

\*Figures obtained from Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , pp. 113-114.

In recent years, however, the rate of crime among Cubans in Miami has grown considerably. Between 1965 and 1971, for example, it doubled.<sup>27</sup> Little Havana, the predominantly Cuban area near downtown Miami, which in 1965 and only four and one-half per cent of the city's crime, accounted for six per cent in 1970.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , pp. 113-114.

<sup>27</sup>Miami Herald, July 1, 1971, p. 9E.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

There are several factors which probably influenced the rise in the crime rate of the exile community. In 1967 and 1968, for example, Miami was the center of operations for several secret Cuban exile terrorist groups. Numerous bombings of commercial establishments, ships, and diplomatic offices of countries maintaining trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba were carried out. Several night clubs and entertainment spots frequented by Cubans were menaced with tear gas bombs. The announced rationale for such bombings was that Cubans should not enjoy themselves as long as Cuba remained under Castro's rule.<sup>29</sup>

Major Delukio of the Miami Police Department indicated in an interview that another possible explanation for the rise in the crime rate could be the fact that the people arriving on the Freedom Flights during recent years may be from a segment of the Cuban population which had a higher crime rate in Cuba than did the economic and social elite groups who came in the earlier period of exile.<sup>30</sup>

It must be considered that the crime rate among all segments of the Miami population has grown between the years 1965 and 1970. It might well be that as the exile becomes less aware of his alien status and

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<sup>29</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , pp. 104-107.

<sup>30</sup>Interview with Major Delukio, August, 1971.



acquires a certain degree of self-confidence, he becomes less careful about his personal conduct.

One aspect of crime among Cubans which has recently received attention from national news media is the existence of a so-called Cuban Mafia, which is supposedly active in drug traffic. Dennis Dayle, a supervisory agent in the Miami regional office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, stated before a House Select Committee on crime that there exists an elaborately organized Cuban Mafia, which has been channeling millions of dollars worth of cocaine through Miami in the past few years.<sup>31</sup>

The effect that this rise in crime will have on the attitude of North Americans towards the Cuban community is an unknown variable. North Americans have traditionally been quick to stereotype minority groups, and it is possible that the growth of crime will generate an unfavorable attitude on the part of some. In several interviews with Anglo-Americans, distinct manifestations of uneasiness and fear appeared in connection with incidents in Cuban ghetto areas of Miami. It would be unfortunate if this rise in crime in the Cuban community causes a generally disfavorable attitude towards exiles, however. As Major Delukio pointed out in his interview, Cubans still have one of the lowest crime rates of any ethnic group in Miami, including

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<sup>31</sup>Miami Herald, July 1, 1971, p. 9E.

white North Americans,<sup>32</sup> and Dayle's report emphasized that "the criminal element among Miami Cubans is relatively small."<sup>33</sup> This element came to the United States, according to Dayle, when the economic depression of Cuba, following the departure of many affluent Cubans and the decline of tourism, made crime no longer profitable. Furthermore, Dayle emphasized that the Cuban Mafia preys primarily upon the Cuban community.<sup>34</sup>

#### Education, the Arts, and Exile Publications

Referring to the educational level of many Cubans who have fled Castro's Cuba, one source reports that "the exodus has been called the greatest brain drain of the century. It has stripped communist Cuba of its best educated and most skilled people."<sup>35</sup>

The educational standards of pre-Castro Cuba were far above those of most of Latin America. In 1956, for example, the average number of university graduates per 1,000 inhabitants was 2.6 in Latin America as a whole, while Cuba in the same period had 3.8 university graduates per 1,000.<sup>36</sup> The Research Institute

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<sup>32</sup> Interview with Major Delukio, op. cit.

<sup>33</sup> Miami Herald, July 1, 1971, p. 9E.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. News and World Report, March, 1967, p. 105.

<sup>36</sup> Batista, op. cit., p. 94.

for Cuba and the Caribbean states:

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the [Cuban] population is the general high level of education. For example, the proportion [of Cubans] who had completed four or more years of college is higher than that [of North Americans] in Dade County, which in turn is higher than that of [North Americans in] the United States at large.<sup>37</sup>

One of the noteworthy characteristics of the Cuban exile is his involvement in various types of continuing education programs. The Cuban Refugee Center, an assistance agency set up by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has provided many types of programs in which thousands of Cubans have enrolled. The University of Miami, aside from the regular courses in which thousands of Cubans are registered, has offered several special programs aimed at the particular needs of the refugees. By 1966, for example, 1,263 Cuban physicians, who had received their medical training earlier in Cuba, completed a special program of instruction designed to retrain them for practice in the United States.<sup>38</sup> A Cuban Teacher Retraining Program, also sponsored by the University of Miami, has assisted over 1,000 Cubans either by placing them in positions as teachers or by admitting a select few to a series of courses to complete their training as teachers. When referring to

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<sup>37</sup>Center . . . , The Cuban Immigration, . . . , p. xiii.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

the Cubans who have taken part in this program, William Clark, the Director, says that their performance has been most commendable. The overall grade point average for regular University of Miami students in 1970 was 2.7 out of a possible 4.0. The grade point average of participants in the Cuban Teachers' Retraining Program was 3.8. This is particularly praiseworthy when it is noted that all of the courses are taught in English.<sup>39</sup>

Under the Division of Continuing Education of the University of Miami, various projects have been organized to serve the Cuban community. The Cuban Culture Program and its sister-program, the Cuban-American Culture Program, have provided lecture courses, seminars, music concerts, and art exhibits aimed at fostering the continued development of Cuban culture and introducing the Cubans to American culture. Some of Cuba's most renowned intellectuals have served as faculty members for these activities, being paid only a token salary. As of the summer of 1970, a total of 11,250 Cubans had taken part in the varied programs at the University of Miami's Koubek Center, which is often referred to by Cubans as "La Universidad de La Habana en Exilio."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Interview with W. Clark of the Cuban Teachers' Retraining Program, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla.

<sup>40</sup> Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher: The University of Havana in Exile.

The Cuban emphasis on educational achievement has evidently been transmitted to the younger Cubans. In one survey conducted by the Center for Advanced International Studies, a sample of fifty-five principals of public and Catholic schools in Dade County showed that the performance of the Cuban child was equal to or above that of the white American, and above that of the Negro American pupil.<sup>41</sup>

Cubans have also been attending regular four-year programs at the University of Miami. Here too, the grade-point average of the Cuban students has been higher than the general average. Cuban men outperformed all other men in all divisions, with the exception of the School of Education, and Cuban females had a higher average than all men and all other women in the University even in the fields of Science and Engineering.<sup>42</sup>

The Miami Herald paid tribute to the academic achievement of Cuban high school students in Dade County in an article on May 10, 1969. It was pointed out that although English was their second language, three of the county's fourteen top high school scholars were Cuban. "They have excelled, and by so doing they reflect credit on themselves and all like them among Dade County's 200,000 refugees from Communist Cuba."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Center . . . , The Cuban Immigration, . . . , op cit., p. 58.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Miami Herald, May 10, 1969.

The involvement of Cubans in the arts in Miami has been quite impressive. Renowned Cuban painters and sculptors serve on the faculty of the University of Miami's Koubec Center, and their works are often displayed. Concerts of the music of famous Cuban composers such as Ernesto Lecuona and Gonzalo Roig have been presented by exiles at the University of Miami, and were invariably attended by "standing room only" crowds. The huge Miami auditorium was filled to capacity for the recent performances of Roig's operetta Cecilia Valdés. There are now well established Cuban ballet and theatrical societies, and their performances are also invariably well attended.

Numerous other examples of Cuban artistic inclination appear in the nightly performances at Cuban supper clubs in Miami. Aside from the featured Cuban folk dances and songs, classical Spanish guitar and Spanish dancing are regular parts of an evening's performance. This orientation is shared by Cubans of all ages. The writer accompanied a group of some fifty Cuban high school students to Key West, where they presented a program of Cuban folk music and dances. It is clearly evident that Cubans are intent on maintaining their traditional art forms.

Also worthy of comment are the Spanish-language newspapers and pamphlets that abound in Miami. These afford a network of communication without which a

distinct Cuban community could scarcely continue to exist. Las Américas, a leading newspaper which serves the Cuban population, has a daily circulation of approximately 64,000. Another popular newspaper among Cubans is Patria, which distributes approximately 43,000 copies weekly. A visit to a typical "kiosko"<sup>44</sup> clearly shows the large number of exile publications available in Miami.<sup>45</sup> The University of Miami has a list of seventy-five Spanish-language pamphlets and newspapers; 67 per cent of these are monthly publications, and the rest are weekly or daily. This indicates that there is not only a vast reading public among Cubans in Miami, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a decided effort on the part of Cuban exiles to keep the Cuban community integrated and its culture alive. Aside from national, state, and local news items, much emphasis is placed on the different activities occurring within Miami's Cuban community. There are always feature articles by renowned exile personalities, which range from commentaries on social and political issues to poetic and other literary works. The large numbers of exile newspapers and pamphlets are evidently significant in the formulation of Cuban public opinion.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Term used to designate a small newspaper stand where refreshments and books may also be sold.

<sup>45</sup>Infra, Appendix III, pp. 203-205.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

### Summary and Conclusions

The goal of Part II of this study has been to provide background for further social analysis of the Miami Cuban exile community, a subgroup of great importance to the life of that city. The following propositions have been developed:

1) The frequent turbulence and political instability in Cuba throughout that country's history has made exile a more or less normal condition for Cubans who have found any of a succession of repressive regimes intolerable.

2) The United States and particularly southern Florida has traditionally provided an "escape hatch" for those seeking refuge from oppressive forces in Cuba. Florida has in many respects become a "home away from home" for hundreds of thousands of Cubans in the last century.

3) The knowledge that the United States has been a haven for Cuban exiles for many decades and the known presence in southern Florida of large numbers of Cubans from previous exile movements undoubtedly made the often traumatic experience of exile more bearable for the Castro refugee and aided in his adaption to life in the United States.

4) The exodus since Castro's takeover in 1959 is by far the most dramatic movement of exile that Cuba has known, due to the numbers of people involved



as well as the broad spectrum of the population which they represent. Castro's exiles are not only of the political elite, but people of the middle and working classes.

5) Cubans have shown favorable patterns of economic and social adjustment in exile. They have nonetheless resisted total assimilation in the North American culture and continue to live in ethnic community clusters; they show a definite desire to keep alive their Hispanic culture. The indicators seem to be that Miami Cubans will follow the example of Key West and Tampa Cubans. In these older exile communities there has occurred a blending of North American and Hispanic cultures rather than a total assimilation of Cubans into the predominant North American culture.

With the background thus established, the road is now paved for an in-depth analysis of the political and social disposition of the Cuban exile and its future implications in Miami/Florida politics.

PART III

THE POLITICS OF THE CUBAN EXILE

CHAPTER VI  
THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL ROLES OF CUBAN EXILES  
IN MIAMI, FLORIDA

Sociological and economic data show that Cuban refugees are adjusting rapidly to life in exile. Some have already achieved economic stability--necessarily their first task after leaving their homeland. Many have fulfilled or will soon fulfill the residency requirements for United States citizenship. The hypothesis that Cuban exiles represent a potential interest group in Miami/Florida politics seems reasonable.

Further verification requires a study of the exiles' potential political roles in Miami/Florida politics.

The Achieved Role

David Easton uses the term "member" to identify the most fundamental role of a person who is part of a political system.<sup>1</sup> The concept is helpful here: clearly the first formal role for Cuban exiles in American politics is that of membership through citizenship.

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<sup>1</sup>David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 57.

It is an "achieved" role in that the exiles through their own initiative must seek and acquire this status. In treating the "achieved role" of membership, the following questions seem pertinent:

1. What are the dispositions of Cuban exiles toward returning to Cuba should the political situation permit?

2. How are exiles disposed toward the idea of acquiring American citizenship?

Castro is evidently firmly established in power, and Cuba will probably experience no drastic political change in the near future. Nevertheless, the disposition of exiles toward a possible return to Cuba will no doubt influence their behavior in exile. If they desire to remain in the United States regardless of the Cuban political situation and if they acquire American citizenship, they will have shown a positive orientation toward life here which should pave the way for future participation in the American political system.

Once exiles acquire citizenship, it is logical to assume that the political interests they express will be influenced, at least in part, by the ethnic factor. As shown above, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee point out that ethnicity is one of the major determinants of one's voting behavior.<sup>2</sup> In seeking to prove

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<sup>2</sup>Supra, p. 8.

this point, the following question was considered:

3. Will Miami Cubans express political interests by means of a voting bloc? If Cuban exiles are inclined to such group expressions, the role they achieve by consolidating their interests into a voting bloc will have an impact on Miami/Florida politics.

These three questions are treated individually below.

The question of continued residency  
in the United States

The most fundamental question is whether Cubans wish to remain in the United States. When the great exodus from Cuba began in the early 1960's, most Cubans apparently did not leave with the idea of making the United States their permanent home. Unlike most migrants they left Cuba, not due to some long-standing general dissatisfaction with their life-style, but because of specific conditions intolerable to them, imposed by Fidel Castro. They viewed the United States, particularly Miami, as a temporary refuge from the "evil" that had forced them from their country. They hoped that the United States would be a springboard from which they could quickly return to Cuba when conditions would permit. Alejandro Portes says the following:

Was not Cuba only ninety miles from the United States and had not the United States repeatedly intervened in Cuban affairs during the whole

republican history of the island? Many refugees came only to help speed this "inevitable" development.<sup>3</sup>

Some observers feel that many exiles have experienced an attitude change toward returning to Cuba. The Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami hypothesizes the situation thus:

It is believed that even if an unexpected upheaval in Cuba were to make conditions for their return propitious, only a relatively small portion of them [Cubans] would immediately go back. . . . Their idea of going home is generally that of traveling to the island one day on a short vacation or a longer stay, not unlike rich immigrants elsewhere who visit their poorer and somewhat backwards relatives left behind in their homeland. . . . Greater Miami, which several years ago had been regarded by many refugees as a temporary place to live in while biding time for a prompt and inevitable homegoing, has now become for most Cubans an area of permanent residence and a city where their economic, social and political roots are deepening as time goes by.<sup>4</sup>

Ed Lakey, of Knight newspapers, states what appears to be a consensus of many who have studied the exile situation. "It is probably safe to say," writes Lakey, "that Miami will always have a Cuban colony and a Latin American cultural flavor."<sup>5</sup> The quantitative data acquired in the present study generally point in

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<sup>3</sup>Alejandro Portes, "Dilemma of a Golden Exile: Integration of Cuban Refugee Families in Milwaukee," American Sociological Review (Albany, N.Y.: The American Sociological Association, August, 1969), pp. 505-518.

<sup>4</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , p. 89.

<sup>5</sup>Ed Lakey, "If Castro Falls, Will Refugees Go Back to the Homeland?", Miami Herald, Feb. 22, 1967, p. 14C.

the same direction. The study group was asked the following question: If communism should be defeated in Cuba, how would you feel about returning there? The responses may be tabulated as follows:

TABLE 3.--Attitudes of Cuban exiles toward returning to Cuba

Would definitely return with the intention of making Cuba my home	29%
Might return with the intention of making Cuba my home	45
Would not return with the intention of making Cuba my home	25

Less than one-third of those questioned indicated a firm intention of returning to Cuba to stay. A plurality chose the least committal answer. Since so many fell into this "might return" category, a qualitative analysis of that answer might prove helpful. It is reasonable to assume that those who said that they "might return" were also implying that they might not. Further insights were acquired from personal comments on individual questionnaires, since this was one of the questions on which a high percentage of respondents, on their own initiative, included such remarks. Other comments were gathered from personal interviews.

Generally, it was found that whereas many exiles still entertain the possibility of returning, they usually admitted that their final decision would depend greatly upon the amount of change that had occurred

in Cuba after so many years of communist domination. Many refugees have begun to face the fact that the "old Cuba" (the one they knew before Castro) can never again become a reality. Frequently those interviewed said they would return to see if any of their confiscated property could be recovered. Yet many realized that property titles have been "legally" transferred and that after so many years of absence from their homeland, it was unlikely that the property could be reclaimed. Another comment often made by refugees who have children was that Cuban exile youth have now become fully acclimated to life in the United States and it would be very difficult for them to be transplanted to Cuba.

Probably one of the most comprehensive views expressed on the matter of exiles returning to Cuba came from a gentleman who has been in the United States since before the Castro Revolution. His views seem to be more objective than those of Cubans personally involved in the trauma of exile. This respondent administers a program designed to aid Cuban exiles in their adaptation process. He supports the proposition that due to the problem of uprooting most refugees will not return to their homeland. Further, he predicts that only the most patriotic of Cuban exiles will definitely return. He bases this conclusion on the fact that, should communism be defeated in Cuba, a painstaking and tedious reconstruction period will ensue. Many young



and middle-aged Cubans have achieved economic security in exile and for that reason would hesitate to return to possibly chaotic and unstable conditions. Most older exiles who are still very much attached to Cuba, according to this evaluation, will no longer have the physical and emotional stamina needed during a period of reconstruction. Mainly those with an extraordinary love for homeland will have the courage to sacrifice themselves to the reconstruction of a non-communist Cuba.

Approximately one-fourth of the refugees interviewed stated unequivocally that they would not return to Cuba. Perhaps a higher number of exiles should fall into this category, but did not openly admit it because of a "bias" factor.<sup>6</sup> Some Cubans feel that if they voice a negative opinion about returning to Cuba, they are guilty of being unpatriotic. This feeling is reinforced by many of the most unassimilated elements of the Cuban community who are quick to brand their more integrated fellow Cubans as traitors. To these

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<sup>6</sup>The literature on sampling techniques indicates that quite often respondents, due to factors such as social pressure, answer some questions with a bias that does not indicate their true and innermost feelings. See Morris J. Slonim, Sampling in a Nutshell (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 24-28; W. G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), pp. 355-393; W. Scott, "Attitude Measurement," Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison Wesley Pub. Co., 1969), II, pp. 204-273; Frederick Mosteller and John W. Turkey, "Data Analysis, Including Statistics," Handbook of Social Psychology, II, pp. 80-203.

"super-patriots" the only possible stand is one of "patria o muerte."<sup>7</sup> Even though the super-patriots in the exile community are probably a minority, they exert a great deal of pressure. One instance of such pressure occurred in early 1968. A tear-gas bomb was placed by the Secret Anti-Communist Army in Exile<sup>8</sup> in the Miami Beach Auditorium at a concert attended mainly by Cubans. The rationale given for this action was that "no Cuban has the right to enjoy himself while Castro remains in Cuba."

Another perhaps less dramatic example of the pressure created by the "volveremos"<sup>9</sup> syndrome is the case cited by a Cuban lady who recounted how she had been criticized and branded as "uncuban" by relatives because she preferred American as opposed to Cuban food. Even this preference was considered to be detrimental to the maintenance of Cuban heritage.

Returning to the quantitative analysis of the replies to this question, several variables appear to be significant:

The age variable.--The students surveyed, representing the younger group, indicate less personal

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<sup>7</sup> Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher: "fatherland or death."

<sup>8</sup> Infra, Appendix II, p. 199.

<sup>9</sup> Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher: "we shall return." Motto used by exiles who are still dedicated to the goal of overthrowing Castro and returning to Cuba.

desire to return to Cuba than do the professionals, representing the older exiles: 24 per cent of the students, as compared to 35.5 per cent of the professionals, expressed a definite intention of returning. The obvious explanation is the age factor. The student group is largely composed of Cubans who have spent some of their most formative years in the United States, and who are therefore probably better adjusted to life here than are most older Cubans. In the case of the high school students questioned, for example, most of them had left Cuba as preadolescents.

The sex variable.--Six per cent more males than females indicated a definite intention of returning to Cuba should conditions permit. This variation might be due to the fact that for some Cuban women adaptation to life in the United States has been easier than it has for males, and in some ways is more advantageous than their previous life in Cuba.<sup>10</sup>

The occupational variable.--Forty-three per cent of the businessmen and 72 per cent of the lawyers, as compared to 22 per cent of the doctors, 27 per cent of the engineers and scientists, and 28 per cent of the teachers, indicated definite intentions of returning should circumstances permit. The unwillingness of such a large percentage of lawyers and businessmen to remain

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<sup>10</sup>See Chapter VIII, p. 136 for further discussion.

permanently in the United States seems indicative of a lack of adjustment to exile conditions on the part of many members of these two groups. It will be shown later that businessmen and lawyers show less progress in their economic and occupational adjustment than the other groups questioned.<sup>11</sup> This explains, at least partially, their greater desire to return to Cuba.

In conclusion, it can be predicted that should Castro fall from power in the near future, less than one-third of the present exile population would definitely return to Cuba. At least one-fourth of the refugees would be relatively unaffected by the news of a change in Cuba's political order. Many exiles would probably initially romanticize the prospects of returning to their homeland, but it is likely that the majority of them would remain in Miami. In the final analysis, most of the Cubans now in Miami would probably continue to reside there on a permanent basis.

#### The question of becoming a citizen

A dramatic moment occurs in the life of immigrants when they take the following Oath of Allegiance to the United States:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and adjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or

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<sup>11</sup>The questions of economic and occupational adjustment is discussed more fully in Chapter VIII, pp. 139-143.

sovereignty of whom, or which, I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform works of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I will take the obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion: So help me God.<sup>12</sup>

Discussing the significance of the naturalization process, Donald Peterson Kent says that "regardless of the motive . . . the acquiring of American citizenship stands as a tribute to the assimilative opportunities of America and the receptive attitude of the newcomer."<sup>13</sup> This very receptiveness should have a favorable effect on the exile's participation in United States politics. If the exiles freely choose to become citizens, and if they have political interests to express, as the data indicate they do, then in all probability they will become political participants. It is even plausible that naturalized citizens since they have willfully chosen to become citizens are more aware of their political rights and duties than some native-born Americans who might tend to take their citizenship for granted since they have had to do nothing to acquire it.

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<sup>12</sup>Oath of Allegiance acquired from the office of the Clerk of the U.S. District Court, Western Division of North Carolina, Charlotte, N.C.

<sup>13</sup>Kent, op. cit., p. 40.

The study group was asked the following question: Would you be opposed to becoming an American citizen?

TABLE 4.--Attitudes of Cuban exiles toward acquiring citizenship

	Professionals		Students		Composite	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Male	8%	92%	17%	83%	12.5%	87.5%
Female	2	98	6	94	4.0	96.0
Total	5	95	12	88	8.5	91.5

It is clear that the overwhelming majority of those questioned are not opposed to the idea of acquiring American citizenship.

The variables.--Two of the variables (sex and occupation) which were manifested in the previous questions about remaining in the United States were significant also in the responses to the citizenship question. Eight and one-half per cent more males than females were opposed to becoming United States citizens. Concerning occupation, the following variables were seen: three per cent of the doctors, engineers, and scientists, and two per cent of the teachers were opposed to becoming citizens; whereas 16 per cent of the businessmen and 19 per cent of the lawyers demonstrated a negative attitude toward becoming citizens. If the act or desire of becoming a citizen shows a receptive

attitude toward living in the United States, then conversely a negative attitude toward citizenship would indicate a lack of receptivity to residing in the United States. Evidently, then, men are less receptive than women, and lawyers and businessmen are less receptive than the other professionals questioned.

Whereas in the responses to the previous question the student group indicated more receptivity to living in exile than the professional group, this pattern is not repeated in the responses to the citizenship question. Seven per cent more students than professionals, in fact, indicated an opposition to acquiring American citizenship. Could this mean that students are not, after all, so receptive to living in the United States?

The first and most practical explanation is that many Cuban college students are eligible for a Cuban Student Loan Program sponsored by the United States federal government. In many respects, this loan has better provisions and is easier to acquire than similar loans for North American students. Once a Cuban acquires citizenship, he becomes ineligible for the Cuban loan. Many of the participants of this study were selected from a list of names supplied by the Cuban Student Loan Office at the University of Miami. Naturally these respondents would be opposed to American citizenship at the present time, for the very

practical reason of remaining eligible for the Cuban Loan Program. Furthermore, most students have not yet faced a need for citizenship as a condition of holding a job or practicing a profession. Medical doctors, for example, in order to establish private practice in Florida, must be citizens. Teachers, also, in order to be fully accredited, must be citizens.

The question of bloc voting

Ethnic groups commonly express their political interests through means of a voting bloc.<sup>14</sup> In order to probe the question of the possibility of bloc voting among Cuban exiles two questions were posed. The first question was addressed to the professionals: If Cuban exiles run for political offices in the United States, would you say that most exiles will probably vote for Cubans? Most exiles will perhaps vote for Cubans? Most exiles will probably not vote for Cubans?

TABLE 5.--Opinions of Miami/Cuban professionals as to future support by the refugee community for Cuban exile candidates running for public office

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Most exiles will probably vote for Cubans . . . .	53%
Most exiles will perhaps vote for Cubans. . . . .	43
Most exiles will probably not vote for Cubans . . .	4

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<sup>14</sup>Supra, p. 9.



The second question was addressed to the student group: If Cuban exiles run for political offices in the United States, would you say that most older refugees will probably vote for Cubans? Most older refugees will perhaps vote for Cubans? Most older refugees will probably not vote for Cubans?

TABLE 6.--Opinions of Miami/Cuban students as to future support by the refugee community for Cuban exile candidates running for public office

Most older refugees will probably vote for Cubans	81%
Most older refugees will perhaps vote for Cubans	28
Most older refugees will probably not vote for Cubans	1

The data presented here indicate a definite tendency towards bloc voting patterns among exiles. If exiles do consolidate their political interests through a voting bloc, they will indeed acquire a meaningful political role in Miami/Florida politics.

During the course of research, the following variables were found to be significant to the bloc voting pattern:

Place of residence.--Members of the study group who live in predominantly Cuban neighborhoods estimate a greater support of Cuban-American candidates than those who live in mixed or predominantly American neighborhoods.

Association with North Americans.--Members of the study group who associate infrequently with North Americans believe that Cuban exiles would give a greater support to Cuban-American candidates for public offices than those respondents who associate more with North Americans.

Future economic status.--Members of the study group who foresee for themselves a lesser economic status in the United States believe that Cuban exiles would give a greater support to Cuban-American candidates than those respondents who expect to achieve a higher or more prosperous economic status in the United States.

Identification with Cuban culture.--Members of the study group who identify more strongly with Cuban culture estimate that Cubans will give greater support to Cuban-American candidates than those respondents who identify less strongly with Cuban culture.

The above data indicate that exiles who do not anticipate support of Cuban-American candidates possibly have become more thoroughly assimilated into American life. Conversely those who anticipate large support of Cuban-American candidates are possibly less assimilated into American life.<sup>15</sup> It should be stressed here

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<sup>15</sup>It should be noted here that on Table 6 the students, who due to the age factor have found assimilation easier, were asked to estimate the other refugees' support of Cuban-American candidates and not their own.

that lack of assimilation does not necessarily imply lack of adaptation. Cuban exiles necessarily on the one hand adjust to life in exile and on the other hand continue to protect their ethnic character traits and resist assimilation. As long as this is the case, ethnicity will probably be a factor in their political behavior.

#### The Ascribed Role

In many ways the future political activity of Miami Cubans will depend on the role allotted to them through the existing political system. This will be referred to here as the "ascribed" role, in that it is assigned rather than earned or "achieved."

#### Ascription through reapportionment of the Florida legislature

One element of the structure of Florida politics which should be considered is the apportionment of the state legislature.

In Southern Politics in State and Nation, the late V. O. Key discusses in detail the problems of representation in Florida and even though his book was published in 1950, many of his observations furnish pertinent background for understanding Florida politics today. Two of Key's observations are relevant to the study of the possible future political influence of Cubans in Miami. In the first instance Key discusses the traditional over-representation of the rural areas

of Florida. "The seven most populous senatorial and house districts contain one-half the population but elect only one-seventh of the senators and one-fifth of the representatives."<sup>16</sup> Until 1967 rural legislators exercised more control over the legislature than did urban legislators. There has been, however, a radical change in the structure of Florida politics as a result of the Baker v. Carr decision in 1962. This Supreme Court decision called for the reapportionment of legislative bodies in the United States on a one-man, one-vote basis. In 1967 the Florida legislature was finally reapportioned, and the large counties achieved equal representation.

This new situation ascribes to Cubans a more important role in Florida politics than would have been possible prior to 1967. Dade County has a population of over 1,200,000 people, one-fifth of the registered voters of the entire state of Florida. Due to reapportionment, Dade County residents now have more political power and should play a more important role in state politics than has previously been the case. Cubans compose at least 15 per cent of the total Dade population. If they become active in politics, they will be an important minority.

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<sup>16</sup>Valdimer Orlando Key, Sr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (Alfred A. Knoph, 1950), p. 92.

Ascription through the growth  
of a two-party system in  
Florida

Another of Professor Key's comments about Florida politics dealt with the traditional one-party system. In the past, the Democratic party controlled the entire political scene. This situation is now in the state of flux. In 1954, for the first time since the Civil War Reconstruction period, Florida elected a Republican to the state legislature. Although political power is still decidedly weighted in favor of the Democrats, there has been a rather dramatic emergence of the Republican Party in the past several years. Out of 48 members of the state Senate in 1968, 20 were Republicans, and out of 119 members of the Florida House of Representatives, thirty-nine were Republicans. The official rosters of voter registration still show that only 21 per cent of the Florida voters are registered Republicans; however, the Republicans continue to make strides, and the emergence of a two-party system in Florida is becoming a reality.<sup>17</sup>

There is a distinct possibility that Miami Cubans will play an important part in the growth of the Republican Party since they are evidently leaning toward membership in it.<sup>18</sup> Exiles are highly

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<sup>17</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social Dynamics . . . , p. 66.

<sup>18</sup>An interview with Mr. Michael Hannon, who served as Assistant Director of Citizens for Nixon-Agnew

conservative on some issues, probably as a result of losing their home to a communist government,<sup>19</sup> and they appear to regard the Republican Party as being more representative of their conservative anti-communist sentiments.

As early as 1964, even though the number of Cuban voters was small, there was an active "Cubans for Goldwater" organization based in Miami; and in 1968, the "Cubans for Nixon" group did much to orient exile opinion in Miami toward Mr. Nixon.<sup>20</sup> Political experts predicted in the 1968 election that the Cuban-American vote would go to the Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon, the Senate candidate, Edward Gurney, and the House candidate, Michael Thompson. As it turned out, Cubans supported the Republican candidates as predicted.<sup>21</sup>

It has been pointed out elsewhere that the formal political strength of the Cuban exile is still

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Campaign, Nationalities Section, 1968. Mr. Hannon disclosed that there was a general belief among those who worked with Cuban exiles in New York during the 1968 campaign that of the small percentage of the Cuban population which was registered, the majority tended to register Republican.

<sup>19</sup>Al Burt and Don Bohning, "Colony is a Potential Giant in Miami's Political Affairs," Miami Herald, February 18, 1968, p. 6B, Column 1.

<sup>20</sup>Frank Solar, "Exiles Believe Nixon Takes Strongest Line," Miami Herald, July 15, 1968, p. 6C.

<sup>21</sup>Miami Herald, November 4, 1968, p. 14C. Infra, footnote 22.

relatively small, due to the fact that so few Cubans have become citizens. A recent study shows, nonetheless, that of the Latin Americans who are registered to vote, the majority of whom are Cubans, approximately 68 per cent are registered Republicans.<sup>22</sup> The role which Cubans play due to their membership in the Republican Party is considered here to be an ascribed role rather than an achieved role in that it assigns to them the ability to participate in the growth of a minority party which, in turn, precipitates the emergence of a more viable two-party political system. It cannot be termed an achieved role in that they are not actually seeking the growth of a two-party system.<sup>23</sup> The joining of a political party per se is an achieved role, in that through their own initiative they acquire the status of party members. The status that they receive, however, by joining a party on the upsurge which is altering the traditional political structure is not due

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<sup>22</sup>Survey taken by Board of Elections, Miami, Fla. Information obtained from Centro Latino Republicano, Miami, on June, 1972, by telephone conversation with the State Chairman, Mario Menenses. Menenses further indicated that a more recent survey not yet fully completed, and taken after the last two swearing-in ceremonies for citizenship in Miami in June, 1972, indicated thus far an even higher orientation towards Republican registration.

<sup>23</sup>The Anglo-Saxon value of a strong two-party system is not part of the exiles' value system in that their political experience in Cuba was one of a multi-party system. Their reason for joining the Republican Party, as stated above, is due to their conservative and anti-Communist sentiments.

to their own initiative but due to conditions that existed prior to exile involvement in Florida politics. By virtue of the exiles' joining the Republican Party, they are assigned or ascribed a particular political status which would not be theirs had they become Democrats instead.

Ascription through politicians'  
appeals for the Cuban vote

Politicians are evidently aware of the potential power of the future Cuban-American vote, as is demonstrated by their attentiveness to the exile community. Many examples can be cited which indicate that politicians are ascribing an important political role to the exile community: Florida Republican Congressman J. Herbert Burke, for example, in August of 1968 called for recognition of a Cuban government in exile to "give free-thinking Cubans hope in recovering their island from the suppression of communism."<sup>24</sup> Also, Democratic State Senator Richard Stone, speaking on September, 1968, before a meeting of the Association for the Reconstruction of Cuba's Economy, took a decidedly favorable position regarding the overthrow of Castro.<sup>25</sup> Democratic Representative to the United States House, Dante Fascell, who is from Miami, has been perhaps the

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<sup>24</sup>Don Bohning, "Government in Exile for Cubans Urged," Miami Herald, August 14, 1968.

<sup>25</sup>"Stone to Be Guest Speaker," Miami Herald, Sept. 23, 1968.



strongest supporter on Capitol Hill of the continuation of the often-criticized United States assistance to Cubans and the Air Lift.

Edward Gurney's campaign for the United States Senate in 1968 furnished another example of the "play" for Cuban support when Gurney stated that "United States action against Castro should include exactly what we didn't do in the Kennedy Administration when we fumbled the ball at the Bay of Pigs."<sup>26</sup>

Ascription through increased emphasis on minority group politics in the American system

A last factor which deserves mention is the ever-increasing role of minority groups in the American political and social system. Women's liberation, black politics, the Chicano Movement are current examples of effective minority pressures. The inclusion of minority representatives in the political mechanism is constantly increasing. This trend may give the Cuban exiles an important opportunity for expressing their interests.

It would seem, then, that several fortuitous political conditions exist at the present time which tend to ascribe to Cuban exiles a significant role in Miami/Florida politics: (1) due to reapportionment,

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<sup>26</sup>"Gurney Wants to Arm Anti-Castro Guerillas," Miami Herald, September 2, 1968.

the urban regions of Florida, which are precisely where Cubans have settled, now have adequate representation in the state; (2) the party to which the Cuban exiles are leaning is undergoing a renaissance in Florida, and this could furnish a greater voice for the future Cuban-American voter; (3) the present orientation of the political system toward minorities could well ascribe to Cubans a vantage point for expressing their interests; and (4) politicians are paying close attention to the emergence of the Cuban vote, and many of their political activities are aimed at influencing Cuban exile public opinion on their behalf.

#### Summary and Conclusions

When the great exodus from Cuba began in the early 1960's, most exiles were inclined to return should Castro be overthrown. The responses made by the 620 Cubans who participated in this study tend, however, to substantiate the view of some observers that many refugees have undergone serious changes in attitude.

William J. McGuire says that attitudes often undergo change due to "conformity situations."<sup>27</sup> This seems to be the case in the apparent attitude change of many Cuban exiles--they have realized the need of conforming to their present situation in the United States and

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<sup>27</sup>William J. McGuire, "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," Handbook of Social Psychology, III, pp. 175-176.

adjusting to their new way of life. Such conformity is implied in the above discussion of the "achieved" role--it appears as though many Cubans will remain in the United States indefinitely. They will become citizens and will probably formulate and express their political interests along ethnic lines.

## CHAPTER VII

### POLITICAL CULTURE IN PRE-CASTRO CUBA

#### Introduction

It appears likely that many Cuban exiles will in the future have a role to play in the American political system. This chapter will survey some conditions in pre-Castro Cuba which may throw some light on the nature of Cuban exile political behavior in the United States. By use of the Almond and Verba classification of political cultures, it will be shown that pre-Castro Cubans, while often subjected to dictatorial governments, nonetheless enjoyed participation in democratic or quasi-democratic political processes from time to time.

If it can be established that participation was part of the political socialization process in Cuba, we may expect that this participant characteristic will reappear among the exiles once they take their place in the American political system. It is further hypothesized that since the political atmosphere in the United States is generally more conducive to participation than was Cuba's, exiles might be even more strongly inclined toward undertaking political activity than they

previously were. Since the present chapter will utilize Almond and Verba's concept of political culture as an analytical construct, a word should be said about the political culture approach.

### What is Political Culture?

The term "political culture," as used here, refers to the psychological orientations of a person or a group towards politics.<sup>1</sup> Almond and Verba offer a three-fold classification of political culture: parochial, subject and participant.<sup>2</sup> Parochial political culture is the least sophisticated and least developed form. This is the type of culture which is found in tribal societies and autonomous local communities which are totally isolated culturally, socially, economically and often geographically from the mainstream of national life. These are societies that have no specialized political roles. "Headmanship," "chieftainship," and "shamanship" are diffuse politico-economic-religious roles; and for members of these societies, the political orientation to these roles is not separated from their religious and social orientations.<sup>3</sup> People that live in a parochial culture have no concept of the relationship of "self" to the national political system; in fact, in extreme cases, they might

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<sup>1</sup>Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 17-19.

not even be cognizant of any other politico-social entity other than their own or that of communities similar to theirs.

The second major classification is subject political culture. Here the individual is aware of a specialized governmental authority and relates to it personally. He might take pride in the political structure within which he lives, or he might dislike it. He might evaluate it as legitimate or illegitimate. A person residing in a subject-oriented political culture does not have any political inputs. He may be interested in politics, but his interest is confined to passive observation rather than active participation.

The most developed and democratically sophisticated form is that categorized by Almond and Verba as participant political culture. Here the individual is not only fully aware of and oriented towards the national political system, he actually participates in it. People with this type of culture "tend to be oriented towards an activist role of the self in the polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary from acceptance of the political system to rejection of the political system . . ." <sup>4</sup> Needless to say, this type of political culture is predominant in the most democratically developed nations.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

The Relationship Between Political Culture  
and Nationalism

It is evident from the above descriptions that there is a relationship between political culture and nationalism.<sup>5</sup> It was seen, for example, that parochial political cultures suffer from a lack of nationalism in that parochials have no sense of "belonging to the nation." Members of subject-oriented cultures have a certain sense of national unity and relate personally to the nation; however, they do not consider themselves as being an integral enough part of society that they could or should participate in national decision-making. Participant cultures, evidently, have the most developed forms of nationalism. Not only do members of a participant culture feel that they belong to the national society, they also see their role as one of participating in national decisions and development. They are, in other words, more thoroughly integrated into the nation than members of subject or parochial political cultures.

One way of treating pre-Castro political culture, then, is to observe the status of nationalism in Cuba. Nationalism will be referred to as group

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<sup>5</sup>The term nationalism as used here refers to a spirit of national identity that exists in integrated societies where the people share many common bonds. For a discussion of nationalism from the viewpoint of social cohesion and integration see Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development, ed. K. H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 126.

identification and integration of the Cuban people which results from a combination of certain geographical, historical, economic, social and political conditions. It will, hopefully, be shown that Cuba had achieved a relatively well developed sense of nationalism prior to Castro, and it is hypothesized that large segments of Cuba's population during certain historical periods saw themselves not only as members of a nation, but moreover as participating members of the political mechanism of that nation. The point of departure here will be to observe certain historical elements of the nation-building process as it occurred in Cuba, and show how national identity or a spirit of nationalism occurred. An understanding of this phenomenon should provide some insight into the present and future course of Cuban exile political behavior in the United States.

#### Historical Factors Conducive to the Growth of Nationalism in Cuba

The beginnings of Cuban national identity can be traced to the bitter struggle that Cubans undertook against the superior forces of Spain. The first attempt at revolution in Cuba in the year 1868 received the support of many Cubans: it can be substantiated that by 1896 the Cuban revolution had become a mass movement. "The politics of General Weyler, sent to take command of the Spanish forces, turned the entire



[Cuban] population against the Spaniards."<sup>6</sup> Such Cuban revolutionary fervor is evidenced in the case of Key West Cubans, cited in Chapter III of this study, and Cuban history shows many other examples of the patriotic dedication of Cubans in their fight against Spain.<sup>7</sup> Even today, most Cuban civic gatherings and many social functions feature as an integral part of their activities the recitation of patriotic poems and the singing of patriotic songs, many dating to the period of the revolution against Spain.<sup>8</sup> This is certainly indicative of a feeling of personal relationship between the "self" and the polity.

In the year 1901, Cubans participated in the electoral process for the first time. After a brief period of political stability under Tomás Estrada Palma (1902-1906), Cuba entered into a rather continuous history of political turbulence. At times, quasi-democratic processes were followed. However,

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<sup>6</sup>Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1965), p. 14.

<sup>7</sup>See Phillip Sheldon Foner, A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the U.S. (New York: International Publishing Co., 1963); John Edwin Fagg, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965); and Albert G. Robinson, Cuba: Old and New (New York: Longman Green and Co., 1915); Espinosa Carballo, Elementos de Historia de Cuba (Miami: Ambar Offset, 1967).

<sup>8</sup>This can be witnessed in the Cuban community in Miami, and radio broadcasts from Cuba indicate that this is still the practice in Cuba.

dictatorship was often the rule, and for the most part Cuba was politically a subject-oriented culture.

One of the most turbulent periods of Cuban history was the rebellion against Gerardo Machado in the early 1930's. During this period definite signs of participant-oriented political culture were evidenced. The students at the University of Havana organized an active resistance against the dictator; they were joined by a well-organized group of professionals.<sup>9</sup> The anti-Machado forces were also composed of many industrial and farm workers. Ernest Schwartz, writing on this subject, says that Cuban laborers carried on an "heroic fight" in the overthrow of Machado.<sup>10</sup> Finally—after thousands fled the island and after much bloodshed, Machado was deposed in 1933. The involvement of many students and professionals continued even after Machado's deposition. These sectors of Cuban society can be said to have formed a viable political interest group which thereafter consistently participated in Cuban politics as long as conditions permitted.

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<sup>9</sup>See Jaime Suchlicki, "El Estudiantado de la Universidad de la Habana en la Política Cubana," Journal of Inter-American Studies (Coral Gables, Fla.: Pan American Foundation and the University of Miami, Jan., 1967), pp. 145-167; also see Suchlicki, "The Stirrings of Cuban Nationalism," ibid., pp. 145-147.

<sup>10</sup>Ernest Schwartz, "Some Observations on Labor Organizations in the Caribbean," The Caribbean: Its Economy (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1954), IV, p. 166.

MacGaffey and Barnett call attention to these new political leaders in the following manner:

A new generation of political leaders emerged who were to remain prominent in public life until 1958. The new political aspirants, among whom the dominant group were usually termed leftwing nationalists, were concerned with economic and social problems and convinced that the government must take the initiative in raising the economic, social and cultural levels of life.<sup>11</sup>

Cuban labor groups also became politically active during the fight against Machado. The CTC (Confederation of Cuban Workers)<sup>12</sup> became a very strong force in Cuba and eventually contained most of Cuba's farm and industrial labor force. Workers, according to some reports, were well represented in the post-Machado national governments.<sup>13</sup> To mention but a few, Representative Lazaro Peña was a laborer in a cigar-making factory, and Representative Blás Roca, Cuba's leading communist prior to the Castro Revolution, had been a leather worker. José A. Nuñez Carballo had been an electrician prior to entering politics. Senator Aurelio Alvarez de la Vega was a carpenter, Representative Manuel Parrado Rodes began as a railroad worker,

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<sup>11</sup>MacGaffey and Barnett, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>12</sup>Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher: Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos. See infra, p. 105.

<sup>13</sup>For a discussion of the role of Cuban labor prior to Batista's coup in 1952 see Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row Pub. Co., 1971), pp. 575-578, 596-598, 606, 618, 653, 673, 677, 713-714, 733, 744, 753-754, 756, 783.

and Representative Jesús Menéndez had worked in the Cuban sugar industry.<sup>14</sup>

It can be said in general that after Machado was deposed many segments of Cuba's population began to involve themselves in politics. Thomas speaks of the years from 1934-1952 as being the "Age of Democracy in Cuba."<sup>15</sup> Batista took power by force in 1933 shortly after Machado's overthrow,<sup>16</sup> but many observers point out that he was dedicated to democratic and reform principles during his early involvement in Cuban politics. Elena Mederos de Gonzalez cites several instances from this time which she feels are indicative of the emergence of democracy. Speaking of the post-Machado period she says the following:

It can truthfully be said that Cubans have been developing political consciousness. The 1939 elections for the Constituent Assembly delegates were exemplary in their order and for their acceptance of the will of the people. The same can be said of the presidential election held in 1944 in which the opposition's candidates defeated the government's

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<sup>14</sup>Personal interview with Julio M. López who, prior to Castro, served for several years as the first secretary of the youth section of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano Auténtico (The Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party), one of Cuba's leading political parties. Due to his position in this party, which elected many labor candidates to public office, López was familiar with the private lives of many of the politicians from the labor forces.

<sup>15</sup>Thomas, op. cit., p. 689.

<sup>16</sup>Batista first entered Cuba's political scene with his "sargents' coup." By uniting the lower officers of Cuba's armed forces, he overthrew the old-line military elite, seized political power and began to initiate much-needed political reform.

(Batista's) candidate, and in which a large percentage of the electorate participated.<sup>17</sup>

Evidently the most democratic aspect of Cuba's history was experienced during the administrations of Dr. Grau San Martín, a university professor who came to the presidency in 1944, and Carlos Prío Socarrás, who entered the presidency in 1948 and remained until Batista's coup in 1952. Kantor states that these presidents gave Cuba "the freest eight years its people ever enjoyed."<sup>18</sup> This was a period in which political parties and all types of interest groups functioned freely. Of the political progress of Cuba during these years, Gonzalez notes that under normal conditions, an average of over 70 per cent of the electorate participated in elections. She further observes that political maturity was shown when "in spite of the ample financial and political backing given by President Carlos Prío Socarrás to his brother who ran for Mayor of Havana in 1950, the people sensed an imposition and repudiated the candidate at the elections."<sup>19</sup> Lowry Nelson's comment about Cuba in his study published in 1951, it is felt, aptly characterizes the conditions

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<sup>17</sup>Elena Mederos de Gonzalez, "The Franchise in the Caribbean," The Caribbean: Its Political Process, ed. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1956), VI, pp. 63-64.

<sup>18</sup>Harry Kantor, Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin America (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 265.

<sup>19</sup>Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 64.

that existed on the island: "Happily for this country, there exists at the present time a freedom of inquiry and expression which is commendable."<sup>20</sup>

Batista's coup in 1952 ended much of the democratic process to which Cubans had become accustomed. It cannot, however, be said that Cubans as a result of the coup became apolitical. Some people continued to engage in political activity, often overtly and at other times underground due to Batista's repression. One group which continued to exert influence, at least during part of Batista's administration, is the Cuban Confederation of Workers. Ernest Schwarz said the following in 1954:

The Cuban Confederation has satisfactorily weathered the latest political storm caused by the Batista coup in 1952. It has been able to preserve its unity and strength as a powerful Cuban institution that even the new dictatorial regime has not dared touch or eliminate.<sup>21</sup>

Another example of political participation during this period is found in the opposition that arose to Batista. Almond and Verba state that participation consists not only in actively supporting a political system, but likewise in rejecting one.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Lowry Nelson, "Cuban Paradoxes," The Caribbean at Mid-Century, ed. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1951), I, p. 148.

<sup>21</sup>Schwarz, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>22</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 18.

Batista's fall from power and Castro's ability to take over the nation was due, in large degree, to general dissatisfaction on the part of most Cubans with Batista. The last three years of Batista's regime were similar to the last years of Machado. "Batista suppressed all opposition ruthlessly, and his increasing use of terror and violence did more than any action of Castro to draw support to the revolutionary movement."<sup>23</sup> Portes discusses in these terms the early support given to Castro's revolution: "It was supported by all sectors, all classes and all generations in Cuba. Seldom has history seen a more complete example of social consensus."<sup>24</sup>

The data presented thus far in this chapter suggest that even though the political history of Cuba has been turbulent and dictatorship has often been prevalent, there were periods of Cuban history in which significant segments of the Cuban masses actively participated in politics, and even periods when the great majority of Cubans undertook political action. Pre-Castro Cuba, in other words, had experience with democracy and the democratic process. The next section, which surveys Cuba's environmental, sociological and economic conditions, tends to reinforce the hypothesis being advanced here, namely, that Cuba, prior to Castro,

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<sup>23</sup>MacGarrecy and Barnett, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>24</sup>Portes, op. cit., p. 506.

was an integrated nation which indeed meets the Almond and Coleman criteria for classifying Cuba even before 1959 as a more highly developed political culture.

### Factors Conducive to National Development in Pre-Castro Cuba

#### Geographical and climatic factors

The adverse geographical and climatic factors which often hinder progress in underdeveloped regions are not prevalent in Cuba. Much of Latin America, for example, faces the problem of enormous mountain ranges which cause social and economic barriers.<sup>25</sup> Cuba has three mountain ranges, and these are relatively small. They have not offered a barrier to communication and national development.<sup>26</sup> Nor do climatic conditions offer any formidable obstacle to development:

Located just inside the Tropic Zone, Cuba has a hot, humid climate but temperatures are moderated by sea breezes. There are no frosts at any time and the only natural evil is wind--hurricanes that now and then rear over the island. Rainfall is adequate and well distributed, and most of the island is well drained. The soil is fairly fertile, and it is computed that 52% of the area is at least potential cropland.<sup>27</sup>

#### Cultural and racial factors

Many underdeveloped regions of Latin America have large segments of population, usually Indian,

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<sup>25</sup> See Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 21.

<sup>26</sup> Kantor, op. cit., p. 256.      <sup>27</sup> Ibid.



which live isolated from the mainstream of national life. These are the countries in which parochial political cultures exist. In this sense, Cuba again compares favorably. From the early days of the colonial period of Cuba's history, the "Indian problem" was non-existent. The Indians that inhabited the island when the Spanish arrived<sup>28</sup> soon disappeared as a distinct racial and cultural group. Some were killed off in skirmishes with the Spaniards, and many died due to the hardships placed on them by the Spanish overlords. Some Cuban Indians migrated to other regions of the Caribbean; the ones that remained were quickly assimilated culturally and biologically by the Spaniards.<sup>29</sup>

Whereas Cuba did not have the problem of integrating Indians into the nation, there has been throughout independent Cuban history a large Negro population. The official census of 1953 showed that 27.2 per cent of the population was black. Some scholars feel as though these figures are inaccurate and that the Negro and mulatto population was much greater than the census indicated.<sup>30</sup> At any rate pre-Castro Cuba did have a

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<sup>28</sup>There were three Indian races in Cuba--the Tainos, the Ciboneyes, and the Guanajatabeyes. See Thomas, op. cit., p. 1516.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 1511-1529.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 1117. Hugh Thomas offers not only his own opinion but also those of Fernando Ortis and MacGaffey and Barnett that the 1953 census grossly underestimates the number of blacks and mulattos in Cuba due to the subjective opinions of the census takers.

large colored population and degree of its integration into the nation is highly pertinent to this study.

The Castro regime in recent years has put great emphasis on the so-called "inferior" position of Negroes prior to the communist takeover. The revolution has evidently taken as one of its causes the destruction of racial prejudice in Cuba. While it is admitted that pre-Castro Cuba had some racial prejudice, especially in the elite private social clubs, it is nonetheless felt that the extent of racial problems has been exaggerated by the supporters of the revolution.<sup>31</sup>

Dr. Manuel Mariñas Carmona, a Cuban Negro who is the former secretary of La Sociedad Unión Fraternal (one of the oldest and most prominent Negro organizations in Cuba), says that in all types of economic and political positions Negroes worked side-by-side with whites in pre-Castro Cuba.<sup>32</sup> He states that "fortunately for the destiny of Cuba, nationalism had already jelled. Besides, there was a mixture, both visible and invisible, which served as a bridge between both races."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Aside from the information offered by scholars on Cuba, the writer conducted two lengthy interviews with Cuban Negroes who lived in Cuba prior to the revolution. Their opinions substantiated the date offered here on the relative lack of racial prejudice in Cuba.

<sup>32</sup>Manuel M. Carmona, "El Negro en Cuba," Conference given at Koubec Center, Division of Continuing Education, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, pp. 26-27.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Cuba never experienced the type of racial tension that has been prevalent in the United States. Maurice Zeitlin states the situation in the following manner:

The social status of the Negro in pre-revolutionary Cuba differed markedly from the status of the Negro in the U. S. Largely as a result of social processes characteristic of Negro slavery and the slaves' emancipation in Cuba in contrast to slavery in the U.S., the barriers to social intercourse between Negroes and whites well before the revolution were not as formidable as those in the United States . . . Jim Crow laws compared to those in America have never existed in Cuba, nor were there other legal, political and social buttresses to Negro exploitation after emancipation from slavery of the type in force in the United States.<sup>34</sup>

The data indicate that racial or cultural prejudice did not pose a barrier to national integration and development in Cuba before Castro.

#### Health conditions

Another factor which indicates the relatively advanced stage of Cuba's national development prior to Castro is found in the case of Cuba's health services. According to a study by the United States Department of Commerce, Cuba in 1951 had almost twice as many physicians and surgeons in relation to the population as did the United States.<sup>35</sup> Although a disproportionate

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<sup>34</sup>Maurice Zeitlin, "Economic Insecurity and the Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers," American Sociological Review (New York: American Sociological Association, Feb. 1966), p. 46.

<sup>35</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, "Investment in Cuba," p. 183, quoted in Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p. 92.

percentage of doctors was congregated in the urban areas, Cuba's health services, for the most part, did make medicine available to the majority of citizens even in the rural regions. Aside from physicians in private practice, there was an organized government health program.

Each of the country's 126 municipios (roughly equivalent to counties in the United States) employed one doctor to give medical attention. He charged a nominal fee, while attention at his clinic or in the hospital was free . . . all of Cuban health steadily improved throughout the history of the republic. The main killers of the past, tuberculosis, typhoid and malaria, decreased substantially. There was no smallpox epidemic after 1897 and no outbreak of yellow fever after 1935. Infant mortality dropped enormously even since in the 1930's.<sup>36</sup>

Lowry Nelson calls attention to the status of health in Cuba prior to the revolution when he discusses a health insurance program that was widespread in Cuba: "Cuba is a world leader in prepayment medical plans and has had them in operation since the 1880's. . . . There is much praiseworthy work being done by the government in the field of health improvement."<sup>37</sup>

### Education

The 1940 Cuban Constitution provided that education be compulsory for all children between the ages of six and fourteen.<sup>38</sup> As with many aspects of the

<sup>36</sup>Thomas, op. cit., pp. 1105-1106.

<sup>37</sup>Nelson, op. cit., p. 146.

<sup>38</sup>Thomas, op. cit., p. 1131.

Constitution, however, the letter of the law was not always fulfilled. Nonetheless, Cuba's level of education prior to Castro was far above that of regions considered underdeveloped. A report from the Department of Commerce states that pre-Castro Cuba had twice as many teachers per capita as the United States.<sup>39</sup> Cuba had four universities. Three of these, the University of Havana, the University of Santiago, and the University of Las Villas, were state-owned. Santo Thomás de Villanueva was a private Catholic university. There were also private colleges, technical schools, schools of arts and crafts, and a school of agriculture in each province.<sup>40</sup> The literacy rate in Cuba in 1960 (prior to Castro's literacy campaign) was 89.8 per cent. The 10.2 per cent of illiterates included the physically and mentally handicapped, senile persons, and a minority of Creole-speaking Haitians.<sup>41</sup> The proliferation of newspapers in Cuba prior to Fidel Castro affirms the existence of a large reading populace. There were between sixty and seventy newspapers. Eighteen of these were well established dailies in Havana. Many of these dailies were read throughout the island, due to Cuba's

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<sup>39</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, loc. cit.

<sup>40</sup>Thomas, op. cit., pp. 1136.

<sup>41</sup>Latin American Center of the University of California, Cuba 1968: Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles, California: 1970), p. 101.

good railway system.<sup>42</sup> A last note of interest is that it was common in pre-Castro Cuba to exempt newspaper firms from corporate income taxes and duties on imported raw materials. This was initially intended to encourage newspaper circulation, even though at times it was used as a means to interfere with the free press.

### Economic factors

There are many economic indicators which further suggest that Cuba was well on the road to becoming a developed country. C. Langdon White points out that Cuba prior to 1959 was one of the few countries in the Caribbean region which had adequate docks, warehouses, refrigeration and ice plants to carry on a good fishing business. The Cuban fishing industry, according to White, was well organized; there was a thriving tuna industry, for example, that kept eight canneries busy.<sup>43</sup> Alan Probert, writing in 1954, points out that Cuba was a rich mineral area. In 1952 Cuba shipped 86,000 metric tons of chromite to the United States--an amount which doubled chromite production in the 1940's. Manganese, according to Probert, was also important in Cuba's development in that it contributed taxes to

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<sup>42</sup>Kantor, op. cit., p. 258.

<sup>43</sup>C. Langdon White, "Water for Irrigation and Power in the Caribbean," The Caribbean: Natural Resources, ed. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1959), IX, p. 187.

government, profit to owners and wages to labor over a long period of Cuba's history. There were also two active oil fields which supplied much of the oil consumption of the nation.<sup>44</sup>

In a 1959 article, Donald MacArthur praised Cuba's economic development program:

The success of the program in attracting capital both domestic and foreign for investment may be measured by the fact that a total of approximately 800 million dollars has gone into new industry and the expansion of old industry since the initiation of the plan. As a result there has been considerable increase in employment. The national product increased by 300 million, foreign exchange earnings by 150 million and tax collections by 3 million. . . .<sup>45</sup>

MacArthur went on to point out that one of the objectives of the program was to expand public facilities; the Cuban electric company planned to double its power facilities, and the Cuban telephone company was in the process of expanding its telephone facilities at a cost of \$61,000,000 to take care of the 177,000 applications for new telephones.<sup>46</sup>

Ramon Crist, in an article entitled "Resources in the Caribbean" indicated that in 1951 Cuba had

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<sup>44</sup>Alan Probert, "The Role of Mineral Resources in the Economy of the Caribbean," The Caribbean: Its Economy, ed. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1954), IV, pp. 40-42.

<sup>45</sup>Donald MacArthur, "Problems in Local Financing in the Caribbean," The Caribbean: Natural Resources, op. cit., p. 245.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 255.

greatly increased its domestic production. He mentioned, for example, that 28,836 farms specialized in meat production and employed more than 100,000 workers, with a total payroll of \$14,000,000. "This increases purchasing power," says Crist. "In the hands of a growing number of Cubans it is used to buy locally grown foodstuffs and the products of modest household industries."<sup>47</sup>

An analysis of the status of the Cuban Labor Movement prior to Castro indicates the growing power of Cuba's middle class and the level of economic and social advancement. Ernest Schwarz says that manifestations of union activity began in Cuba as early as 1889. In the early 1900's the movement began to gain strength. Some of the achievements of the Confederation of Cuban Workers were as follows: wages were far above those paid in most areas of Latin America. In addition to the eight-hour working day there were many types of social insurance programs provided by law. The power and funds of the CTC were adequate to make sure that the social legislation was enforced. The sugar workers union, to cite but one example, had a fund of approximately \$500,000,000 and its insurance covered medical attention, sickness and accidents. The Confederation of Cuban Workers had even taken steps,

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<sup>47</sup>Ramon Crist, "Resources of the Caribbean," The Caribbean at Mid-Century, op. cit., pp. 39-40.



according to Schwarz, to administer through its own economic program a compensation plan to provide for the seasonal nature of employment and production of the Cuban sugar industry.<sup>48</sup> Schwarz concludes:

Today [1954] the Confederation counts more than a million members--with its 500,000 sugar workers constituting the most powerful of the thirty-five national federations affiliated with it, and representing every branch of industry and agriculture on the island. The Confederation has drawn every fifth Cuban into its ranks, and has thus obtained a much higher numerical degree of organization in proportion to the population than the much larger movement in the United States.<sup>49</sup>

It is clear that Cuba had reached a relatively high state of economic and social advancement prior to the Castro revolution. James Maddox says, for example, that Cuba does not have vast areas of underdeveloped land or extreme population pressures. "Industry and agriculture are better organized than in most Latin American countries and Cuba's standard of living [was] above most areas of Latin America."<sup>50</sup>

In the same vein, C. A. Hennessy, when speaking of the roots of Cuban nationalism, states the following:

The island has an equable climate, with neither the difficulty of altitude nor semi-desert. It has no Indian problem; its Negro population is extroverted and easier to assimilate than Indians with their distinctive cultures and often different languages.

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<sup>48</sup>Schwarz, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>James Maddox, "The Major Land Utilization Problem in the Caribbean," The Caribbean: Peoples, Problems and Prospects, ed. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1952), II, p. 38.

It is 60 per cent urbanized . . . it was fourth among the countries of Latin America in number of literacies and third in the number of students receiving higher education.<sup>51</sup>

### Summary and Conclusions

It can be said in conclusion that pre-Castro Cuba was marked by many environmental, social, economic and political factors which encouraged a growing sense of nationalism and national identification and which were conducive to the growth of democratic participation. The idea that Cuba was a totally underdeveloped region with the masses representing an unintegrated parochial political culture simply does not appear to be valid. It was shown, for example, that during the period of revolt against Spain the Cuban population as a whole was integrated into the cause of national independence. The struggle against Spain created among Cubans a strong sense of national identity and national unity. Certainly the independence period shows some evidence of a participant-oriented political culture emerging in Cuba. After independence was achieved, Cuban politics in general entered into a period of constant chaos. Cubans still identified with the nation; however, since dictatorship was usually the name of the political game, their identification was often one of "passively belonging to the nation" rather than being

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<sup>51</sup>C. A. Hennessy, "Roots of Cuban Nationalism," International Affairs (London: Chatham House, July, 1963), p. 358.

part of and participating in the political process. The predominant political culture traits during the post-independence period were evidently subject-oriented traits.

Eventually many segments of the Cuban population tired of their passive role in politics, and opposition grew against the autocratic tendencies of General Machado's regime. Organized political interest groups began to emerge. Labor groups began to exert an influence on Cuban politics, and university students, college professors and other professionals became quite active in their anti-Machado fight. With Machado's deposition in 1933 the tendencies toward a participant political culture became even more evident. During at least an eight-year period in Cuba's history (the administrations of Grau and Prío), Cuba's middle class and even the working class, due to the strength of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, which represented farmers and industrial workers, played a vital role in Cuban politics. During this period Cubans as a whole began to actively participate in politics. Participation was curtailed after Batista resumed power in 1952; however, there is considerable evidence that interest groups played an important political role in the country. The Confederation of Cuban Workers, for example, maintained its strength during much of Batista's administration. When Batista's suppression

became unbearable to the Cuban population, mass support was mustered for the revolutionary movement of Fidel Castro; according to available evidence, one of the main reasons for Batista's fall and Castro's final takeover was the withdrawal of support for Batista regime: the Church, the army, and the public in general all became disenchanted with his dictatorial policies.

To answer the question which has been the primary concern of this chapter, the following may be said: Cuba prior to Castro had undergone many periods during which the population was subjected to dictatorial regimes. There were, nonetheless, many occasions when political interest groups became active, and there were even periods when active participation on the part of the people as a whole was prevalent. Pre-Castro Cuba was, therefore, according to this analysis, a nation which at varying times had a political culture composed of subject-oriented and participant-oriented traits.

Finally, it should be reiterated and emphasized here, in order to complete this analysis, that the exile is no ordinary migrant. The decision to leave one's homeland to go into exile is, in itself, a political activity. If Almond and Verba's thesis is true that rejection is a form of political participation, then it can be further suggested that those

Cubans who rejected Castro to the degree of leaving their homeland and facing a whole new life have brought with them into exile certain traits of their former participant-oriented political culture which helps to explain their political behavior as exiles in the United States.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CUBAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN EXILE

The foregoing analysis suggests that upon arrival in the United States the Cuban exiles were products of a political culture consisting of a blend of subject-oriented and participant-oriented traits. The question which must now be treated deals with the ways in which this political heritage was manifested by the refugees during their years of exile. This chapter will consider (1) early exile political activity in Miami, and (2) the present status of exile political organizations in Miami.

#### Early Exile Political Activity

It should be recalled that many exiles came to the United States with the idea of engaging in activities which would help speed the downfall of Castro.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore not surprising that many began to involve themselves in Cuba-oriented<sup>2</sup> political activities soon after arriving.

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<sup>1</sup>See Portes, op. cit., pp. 506-507.

<sup>2</sup>The term "Cuba-oriented" will be used here to denote those political activities which had as their aim the overthrow of Castro and the return of the exiles to Cuba.

The year 1960 saw the birth of many Miami-based groups which became active in exile politics. On August 7 of that year, for example, the Anti-Castro Liberation Alliance was formed in Miami Beach. This organization received much publicity in the Miami news media due to the fact that two well-known former Castro armed forces officers, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz and Nino Diaz, were among its leaders.<sup>3</sup> Evidently the Anti-Castro Liberation Alliance had close contact with the Cuban underground, since the Alliance frequently announced news items about the achievements of Anti-Castro guerilla forces in Cuba.<sup>4</sup> Two other important exile groups that became active in 1960 were the Revolutionary Movement of the People, headed by Manuel Rey, and the Democratic Revolutionary Front, directed by Dr. Manuel A. de Varona.<sup>5</sup> These organizations held frequent meetings, most of which received news coverage in the North American and Latin American press in Miami. The exile groups, aside from formulating long-range plans for Castro's overthrow, often disclosed some of the specific revolutionary activities in which they were engaged. Dr. de Varona, for example, reported to the press on December 13, 1961, that the Democratic Revolutionary Front was responsible for

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<sup>3</sup>Cuba, The United States and Russia, ed. Lester A. Sobel (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1964) p. 25.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

dropping anti-Castro leaflets over the city of Havana.<sup>6</sup>

Political activities among exile organizations increased in 1961. On January 23 of that year a meeting of exiles was held in Miami to which sixty recognized political organizations were invited to discuss plans for the overthrow of Castro.<sup>7</sup> The gravest problem encountered at this meeting (as by exile political groups in general) was the lack of organization. According to the New York Times, "Castro foes represent a headless movement of many groups whose only strong bond is the desire to unseat the Havana Regime."<sup>8</sup>

By March of 1961 one of the most noteworthy occurrences in exile political history took place. Two of the strongest exile groups, The Revolutionary Movement of the People and The Democratic Revolutionary Front (which represented five different exile groups) announced a merger. The new group, named the National Revolutionary Council, was to be headed by the former premiere of Castro's Cuba, Jose Miró Cardona.<sup>9</sup> Its platform consisted essentially of four goals: (1) the overthrow of Castro, (2) the conduct of free elections in Cuba after Castro was removed from power, (3) the

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> New York Times, January 23, 1961, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> New York Times, March 22, 1961, p. 5.



return to former owners of property confiscated by the revolutionary government, and (4) the continuation of economic and social reform in Cuba within the democratic framework.<sup>10</sup>

Throughout 1961 the reports of exile political activity were numerous. On April 7 it was disclosed that for nearly nine months exile forces had been training in the United States and in Central America for the overthrow of Castro.<sup>11</sup> The New York Times estimated the force at between 5,000 and 6,000 men. The exile army was supposedly under the control of the National Revolutionary Council headed by Cardona. This period of frenzied political activity within the Miami Cuban community was referred to by the New York Times in the following statement:

In the strange atmosphere of Miami, bulging with revolutionaries, the preparations against Dr. Castro are an open secret . . . They are discussed in the streets, in Cuban cafes and restaurants and almost everywhere that Cubans congregate. Local newspapers openly refer to incidents in the camps.<sup>12</sup>

Many exile doctors joined the movement and began making heavy purchases of blood plasma and other medical items supposedly to be used in the invasion against Castro.<sup>13</sup> The soldiers being prepared for the attack had formerly been given only part-time training

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

while they held full-time jobs, but they were now full-time "revolutionaries" receiving monthly checks apparently issued by the Revolutionary Council. During this period there was much contact with the Cuban anti-Castro underground forces. According to the New York Times, "The traffic of couriers serving the underground goes on constantly; special boats equipped with powerful radio transmitters make daily runs to the Cuban coast and relay anti-Castro broadcasts."<sup>14</sup>

The political alertness of the exile community was reflected in newspaper reports: "As the preparations quicken, the rumors and the hopes rise along the Miami streets where Spanish is heard as often as English."<sup>15</sup> Finally, on April 17th, the landing of a revolutionary force at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba was announced. Political interest was now at its height among the exiles. Cuban males flocked to varied exile organizations offering their help in the invasion.<sup>16</sup> On April 20, the New York Times stated that there was even a mounting number of North Americans who filled out applications to join the rebel forces. Applications came from places as far away as Alaska, and among

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> New York Times, April 18, 1961.

<sup>16</sup> The present writer was told by respondents living in Miami at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion that exile males, including many elderly men, flocked to Miami from all parts of the United States with the hope of joining the fight.

the applications there were large numbers of former Hungarian Freedom fighters.<sup>17</sup>

Most of the 1,500 rebels who landed in the Bay of Pigs Invasion force were either captured or killed. This total failure at ridding Cuba of communism caused much disillusionment on the part of exiles; however, some groups still held to the idea of defeating Castro.

Many refugees blamed the Bay of Pigs Invasion's failure on the United States. It was charged that the Central Intelligence Agency, which planned the attack, failed to coordinate its plans with the anti-Castro underground. Manuel Rey's People's Revolutionary Movement, which had been part of the National Revolutionary Council, withdrew from the Council on May 22, blaming the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Revolutionary Council for the Invasion fiasco.<sup>18</sup>

Rumors abounded that exiles were training for another invasion. On June 25, 1961, Florida Senator George Smathers confirmed these rumors,<sup>19</sup> and on June 27 the Miami Herald reported that the group in charge of this new force was the Junta Revolucionaria de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Revolutionary Committee].

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<sup>17</sup> New York Times, April 20, 1961.

<sup>18</sup> Cuba, The United States and Russia, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

No full scale invasion ever materialized; however, the transporting of arms to Cuba and many small scale raids were frequent during the remaining part of 1961 and throughout 1962.<sup>20</sup> In late 1962, it became clear that as a result of the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States would not intervene militarily in Cuba, since Russia had agreed to withdraw the offensive missiles from the island, in return for which the United States promised not to attempt to overthrow Castro through force. Most refugees realized that without United States backing, their cause was fruitless. In 1963 the most important group, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, disappeared from the exile political scene.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> On August 24, 1961, the Havana suburb of Miramar was shelled from two motor boats manned by 23 members of the Miami-based Student Revolutionary Directorate. The group announced that they bombarded the Chaplin Theater while a group of Czechoslovaks and Russians were holding a conference. On September 11, 1961, a forty-foot exile boat attacked a Cuban boat and a British freighter docked in the port town of Caibarien, Cuba. The British ship was fired on thirteen times and the Cuban ship eighteen times. The exile group which claimed the attack on these ships was ALFA 66, based in Miami. On March 18, 1962, the Soviet Freighter EVOV was attacked by an exile group in the coastal town of Isabela de Sagua. Reports stated that twelve Russian sailors were wounded by machine gun fire. The militant Miami-based ALFA 66 took credit for this attack along with the attack on March 26 on the Soviet ship BAKU. On April 26, 1962, it was announced in Miami that exiles had attacked a Havana old refinery successfully and on September 8 reports cited that Cuba's largest sugar mill was eliminated as a producer due to an exile bombing attack. See Cuba, The United States and Russia, op. cit., pp. 107-127.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

According to a report from the University of Miami's Center for International Studies, Cuban exiles began moving more than ever away from an almost entirely Cuba-oriented posture to being basically United States-oriented after 1963.

Following the [National Revolutionary] Council's demise, which unleashed a chain of similar developments, the remaining exile political groups rapidly began losing their professed raison d'etre: to be a major element in the overthrow of Castro rule and to be ready for a takeover in case of its collapse.<sup>22</sup>

#### Present Status of Cuban Exile Political Organizations

The state of exile political organizations has continually worsened since 1963. The Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami reports that exiles have finally realized that they have ceased to be a factor in political events in Cuba:

This assessment is today accepted by practically all refugees, with the exception of a small group of old-line politicians, whose political myopia is matched if not exceeded by their self-esteem.<sup>23</sup>

One factor which indicates that the Center's assessment is correct is that most of the exile leaders have faded into the North American milieu. Many of them have left Miami and are dedicating their time and energies to establishing a new life for themselves and their families in the United States. A notable case is that of a Cuban physician who, though formerly deeply

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

involved in exile politics, now remains aloof from all exile politics and maintains a lucrative medical practice in the mountains of North Carolina. His family is becoming rapidly assimilated into its new environment even to the extent that his children are losing their ability to speak Spanish.<sup>24</sup> Erneido Oliva is another of the many former exile leaders who have left Miami and are uninvolved in Cuba-oriented politics. Oliva, the "number two man" in the Bay of Pigs Invasion, now holds an important position in Washington, D.C. as a reviewer for federal grants which affect that city's large Spanish-speaking population.<sup>25</sup>

The Miami Herald, on February 17, 1968, discussed the present circumstances of a number of such former leaders, pointing out that Dr. Jose Miró Cardona, once head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, now devotes his time to teaching law at the University of Puerto Rico. Another renowned exile figure, Manuel Rey, pursues a private career as an engineer in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Miami Herald also mentioned several other leaders no longer involved in exile politics, concluding that "today the exiles lack a representative leader and their cause lacks a sense of urgency because Cuba's fate depends largely on the

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<sup>24</sup>From personal interview with the doctor and his family.

<sup>25</sup>"Invasion Leader Gets D.C. Job," Miami Herald, July 13, 1970.

world conflict between the United States and communism."<sup>26</sup>

It would appear that the political activities of Cuban exiles, having failed to accomplish the goal of unseating Castro, no longer represent a useful and meaningful way for them to pass their time in Miami. Few exiles now involve themselves in Cuba-oriented politics. Some groups still function, but evidently they are composed mainly of die-hards who find it difficult to accept the reality of the existing situation. They continue to plan Castro's downfall but are powerless to have any real effect on Cuban politics. The only practical purpose that they serve, as will be shown later, is to keep constantly before the eyes of the exile community the "dangers" and the "evils" of communism through their incessant anti-communist propaganda.

The quantitative data acquired during the course of this research tend to show that exile politics is on the decline. The study group was asked the following question: Do you belong to or plan to join an exile political organization or party? Only 11 per cent of the respondents answered affirmatively. Eighty-nine per cent do not belong to and have no intentions of joining exile political groups.

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<sup>26</sup>"Firebrands Giving Way to Civic-Minded Exiles," Miami Herald, February 17, 1968, p. 9A.

A more detailed analysis of the responses indicates that the same variables that helped to explain exile attitudes toward remaining in the United States are again helpful in understanding attitudes towards exile political activity. These variables of age, sex, and occupation are shown in the following tables:

TABLE 7.--A comparison of student and professional answers to the question of participation in exile political organizations

	Students	Professionals
Percentage who affirm participation or anticipated participation	8%	14%
Percentage who deny participation or anticipated participation	92	86

TABLE 8.--A comparison of female and male responses to the question of participation in exile political organizations

	Female	Male
Percentage who affirm participation or anticipated participation	6%	16%
Percentage who deny participation or anticipated participation	94	84



TABLE 9.--A comparison of the responses of medical doctors, engineers and scientists, teachers, businessmen, and lawyers to the question of participation in exile political organizations

	M.D.'s	Eng. & Sci.	Teachers	Bus.men	Lawyers
Percentage who affirm participation or anticipated participation	16%	12%	7%	27%	29%
Percentage who deny participated or anticipated participation	84	88	93	73	71

Further analysis of these tables shows that only a minority of the study group was or anticipated becoming involved in exile political organizations. Within this minority, the number of professionals exceeded the number of students by six per cent, while males exceeded females by ten per cent. It will also be noted that businessmen and lawyers acknowledged greater involvement in exile politics than any of the other occupational groups in the survey. The mean average of businessmen and lawyers who admitted involvement or anticipated involvement, when compared to the rates for the other occupational groups questioned, shows the following: there were 16 per cent more

lawyers and businessmen than engineers and scientists, 12 per cent more lawyers and businessmen than doctors, and 21 per cent more lawyers and businessmen than teachers.

As mentioned above, the pattern of age, sex, and occupation apparent in the responses to this question was also seen in the responses to the questions considered in Chapter VI on the dispositions of the study group towards remaining permanently in the United States. A brief analysis of this recurring pattern is quite revealing: more older than younger Cubans, more males than females, and more businessmen and lawyers than other professionals indicate a less favorable pattern of adaptivity to life in the United States. Also they apparently have a greater desire to return to Cuba. These same groups that show less favorable adaptation patterns to life in the United States and a greater desire to return to Cuba also manifest a higher percentage of participation in exile political associations than do the others. It appears that there is perhaps a correlation between participation in exile political associations and adaptivity to life in the United States. This correlation is suggestive of the following: many of those who continue to participate in exile political groups have been unable or unwilling to adjust to life in exile. They consequently continue to strive for the overthrow of Castro and a triumphant

return to Cuba. They engage in planning for these goals at a time when most Cuban exiles have already realized that the fate of Cuba is not in their hands. Harold Laswell defines politics as the displacement of private motives on public objects.<sup>27</sup> In this frame of reference the following hypothesis perhaps explains the continued existence of exile political associations in Miami: where  $pM$  = the private motive of maladjustment to life in exile,  $\}$  = transformed into,  $dCEC$  = the displacement of the private motive on the public object of the Cuban exile community,  $rV$  = the rationalization of the displacement through the "volveremos" syndrome, and  $cepo$  = cuban exile political organizations, the following proposition is formulated:  $pM \} dCEC \} rV = cepo$ .

Dr. Ruben Rumbart, a psychiatrist who has studied the psychological effects of exile, points out that the sudden role change, the anticipation of uncertainty, risk, struggle, perhaps decline and failure, put a strain on the exile's coping devices. Exiles who find adjustment difficult, must, according to Rumbart, deal with frustration and anxiety.<sup>28</sup> They often develop what Donald P. Kent refers to as "the refugee psychology," which involves among other things "a

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<sup>27</sup> Harold Laswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> Ruben Rumbart, Unpublished paper delivered to the American Psychiatric Association, Miami, May 6, 1969, p. 7.

constant looking back to the halcyon days of yore in the old country."<sup>29</sup> The formula  $pM \} dCEC \} rV = cepto$  expresses, it is felt, the existence of a refugee psychology similar to that described by Kent among many participants in exile political groups. Due to their inability to cope with exile, some refugees sublimate their maladjustment by participating in organizations which still cling to the hope of overthrowing Castro. They cry "volveremos," they wait and they hope.

The proposition  $pM \} dCEC \} rV = cepto$  is further substantiated by an in-depth analysis of the variables:

#### The age variable

The fact that the younger portion of the study group (the students) indicated more willingness to remain permanently in the United States and, therefore, a greater degree of receptivity to life in exile, needs little explanation. It is generally conceded that younger people adjust more easily to new situations than older people. It has been found that a person is most receptive to change during the pre-adolescent period.<sup>30</sup> More than half of the student group in the survey were preadolescents when they came to the United States. It is logical to assume that age was a factor in their

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<sup>29</sup> Donald Peterson Kent, The Refugee Intellectual (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 214.

<sup>30</sup> McGuire, op. cit., p. 248.

adjustment to life in exile.<sup>31</sup> This explains, it is felt, the fact that relatively few younger Cubans belong to exile political associations which still stress the goals of defeating Castro and return to Cuba.<sup>32</sup>

#### The sex variable

The following factors perhaps explain why women have indicated more receptivity to American life and less attachment of Cuba-oriented politics than men:

Occupational adjustment.--Women have been more readily hired than men in many lines of work (i.e., as sales clerks in department stores, as seamstresses in the numerous Miami clothing manufacturers, and as maids in Miami and Miami Beach hotels). It is further suggested, judging from the responses of many exiles interviewed for this study, that the female also finds it easier to accept employment in positions which are perhaps below her qualifications and regards this condition as less an "ego" threat than does the male.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Approximately 50 per cent of the student participants were, at the time of the survey, between the ages of 17 and 19. Most of them have been in exile for approximately eight to ten years.

<sup>32</sup>Many examples of youth receptivity were noted. Some young people interviewed spoke of "refugiados" (refugees) as something almost foreign to them. Many of them speak English with no trace of an accent. Of all the students 36 per cent said that they speak English better than Spanish and 33 per cent said that they speak English equally as well as Spanish. Less than one-third of the group said they speak Spanish better than English.

<sup>33</sup>It has been observed in dealing with Cuban

Female independence.--Another indicator of female responsiveness to life in exile is seen in the results of a survey undertaken by the Miami Herald. The study treats the subject of "the increased independence of women in exile."<sup>34</sup> American society has traditionally afforded females more independence than has the male-dominated Latin society; according to the Miami Herald's study, Cuban females voiced contentment with this newfound freedom. Women need no longer resign themselves to playing the role of totally submissive females, which evidently was part of the accepted standard in many Cuban families.<sup>35</sup> This attitude change, coupled with the new economic independence of Cuban women in exile, affords many females a status unrealized in Cuba.

Family life.--Often it is pointed out that the adversity of exile seems to have purified family life. This refers to the fact that the informal system of polygamy, which was common in Cuba, is rare in exile.

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males that the Spanish "orgullo" syndrome is deeply ingrained. The term "orgullo" as used here refers to the immense pride (some might call it an exaggerated ego) that the male of Spanish stock is noted for.

<sup>34</sup>Ed Lakey, "Refugees Discover One Wife Enough," Miami Herald, Feb. 22, 1967, p. 14C.

<sup>35</sup>There is possibly some relationship between this unwillingness to submit to a male-dominated family unit and the present rise in the divorce rate among Cuban exiles, which is higher than it was in pre-Castro Cuba.

Social workers in Miami who have worked among the Cuban community point out:

We have had wives tell us that they are grateful for their adversity, because their husbands have acquired a new sense of values. . . . The wives report that their husbands, who were wealthy and self-indulgent in their Cuban lives, are too tired and too poor to keep another woman.<sup>36</sup>

Female flexibility.--Many people who have dealt with exiles indicate that the female is more receptive to life in the United States perhaps because women in general are more flexible than men and have an innate facility for adapting to new situations.<sup>37</sup> The field of social psychology furnishes some valuable insights into this subject. When speaking of the flexibility apparent in females in relation to attitude change, William McGuire states the following:

There seems to be a clear main-order effect of sex on influenciability, such that females are more suceptible [to change] than males . . . many suggest that this is due to the yielding of females which is considered a cultural trait . . . we suggest that the greater influenciability of females may be due to their more effective message reception rather than to their greater yielding: there is, in fact, some evidence that females are in general more verbal, and more likely to comprehend the spoken and written word.<sup>38</sup>

McGuire continues in a vein which is particularly relevant to the situation of exile:

It would follow that sex differences in influenciability should be more pronounced as the communication situation becomes more complete and

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<sup>36</sup>Lakey, op. cit.      <sup>37</sup>Kent, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>38</sup>McGuire, op. cit., p. 251.

requires greater verbal interest and skill for adequate reception of the message.<sup>39</sup>

These findings on the flexibility of women seem to be substantiated in the greater willingness of Cuban women to remain in the United States. They seem generally to be better adjusted to exile, and, consequently, less frustrated. This, in part, perhaps accounts for their smaller degree of participation in exile politics.<sup>40</sup>

#### The occupational variable

There are several aspects of the occupational variable between lawyers and businessmen on one hand and doctors, teachers, scientists and engineers on the other, that deserve treatment.

Income factors.--Achieving an income level similar to or higher than that enjoyed in Cuba is an important factor in an exile's pattern of adjustment. With this idea in mind, the following question was posed to the study group: How do you expect your future economic status in the United States to compare to the economic status you could have reached in Cuba?

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid. It is the writer's opinion, based upon acquaintance with the Cuban exile community, that Cuban females, unless they remain at home as full-time housewives, tend to acquire a more rapid conversational use of English. Again, as cited above, the "orgullo" of the Cuban male appears to cause him to be apprehensive about making errors when speaking English. The Cuban female, however, is seen as being very verbose and not preoccupied with the perfect use of the language, but more importantly with "getting the point across."

<sup>40</sup>This statement is not meant to explain fully why women are less involved in exile politics and it is



TABLE 10.--Financial expectations of Cuban exiles in the United States compared to their financial expectations in Cuba

	M.D.'s	Eng. & Sci.	Teachers	Bus. men	Lawyers
Higher status in the <u>U.S.</u>	38%	24%	16%	15%	3%
Higher status in <u>Cuba</u>	28	44	56	64	82
The <u>same</u> in U.S. as Cuba	34	32	29	21	15

It is clear from this table that the financial expectations of the lawyers are by far the least fulfilled among those of the professional groups, thus for them adjustment to life in exile is probably the most difficult of all exile groups in Miami. Businessmen follow lawyers in the maladjustment pattern in that only 36 per cent of the businessmen interviewed expect that they will reach a status that is the same as or perhaps better than they could have had in Cuba. This, it is believed, at least partially accounts for the greater desire of these two groups to return to Cuba, and for their higher participation in exile politics.

realized that one plausible reason is that they were perhaps less involved in politics in Cuba. It is held, however, that their higher rate of adaptation in exile tends to disorient them from exile political participation.

Occupational adjustment and the use of one's talents.--Even yet another vital aspect of adjustment has to do with occupational adaptation and the use of one's talents. In addressing himself to this question of occupational adjustment, Kent says the following:

A successful transplanting of one's former occupation . . . carries with it certain attitudes favorable to community service, resources suitable to participation in the social life of the community, and close contact with the native Americans who predominate in almost all professional fields.<sup>41</sup>

The ability of the refugee to continue his chosen profession and therefore to make use of his talents to the fullest is clearly a boost in the adaptation process. Conversely, inability to adjust in this manner will be a source of frustration often preventing him from adapting fully to his new situation. The exiles who have this problem, like those who show poor adjustment patterns in other areas of their lives, will tend to cling to the past. This furnishes another compulsion for the refugee to become involved in exile political organizations. Through such involvement he is able to sublimate his dissatisfaction with life in exile by associating with other people who are not well adjusted and who have as their chief aims the overthrow of Castro and the triumphant return to Cuba.

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<sup>41</sup>Kent, op. cit., p. 73.

Concerning the questions of occupational adjustment and the use of one's talents, the following data were found:

TABLE 11.--Percentage of professionals in each group who have been able to continue their pre-Castro profession in exile

Engineers and Scientists	97%
M.D.'s	91
Teachers	69
Businessmen	59
Lawyers	16

The study group was also asked, "Do you feel as though you will be able to make as full a use of your talents in this country as you would have been able to in Cuba?" Tabulation of the negative responses shows a familiar pattern:

TABLE 12.--Percentages of Cuban exiles who do not expect to make as full a use of their talents in the U.S. as they would have in Cuba

	Percentages of Negative Answers
M.D.'s	0%
Engineers and Scientists	6
Teachers	14
Businessmen	26
Lawyers	68

Once again, the expectations of lawyers<sup>42</sup> and businessmen seem to be the least fulfilled among those of the occupational groups. This furnished further possible explanation for their relatively high participation in exile politics.

The hypothesis that  $pM \} dCEC \} rV + cepo$ , seems to be born out by the data presented here. It has been shown through cross tabulation that the minority of respondents who acknowledge continued participation in Cuba-oriented politics are heavily represented by the older professional Cuban male as opposed to the younger male students surveyed. It was also shown that many of those active in exile politics have found income and occupational adjustment quite difficult. The indications seem clear that many participants in Cuba-oriented politics are perhaps seeking refuge from a frustrating life style as a means of sublimating their anxiety into the utopian goals of exile political organizations.

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<sup>42</sup>It is the writer's opinion that the question of the occupational adjustment of lawyers is one of the most serious problems presented by the exile phenomenon. The President of the Colegio Nacional de Abogados en el Exilio in a personal interview lamented the fact that no special program has been devised to retrain refugee lawyers. Whereas the legal code used in the United States is generally different from that used in Cuba, there are some areas of the law, i.e. real estate laws, in which Cubans could be retrained to provide some type of legal aid.

### Summary and Conclusions

It was shown in Chapter VII that Cuba prior to the advent of Fidel Castro displayed a mixture of subject-oriented and participant-oriented political culture. It was suggested that those Cubans who came into exile were oriented toward political participation based not only on their political involvement prior to leaving Cuba for exile, but also to their total rejection of Castro. It was also shown that the Miami-Cuban population maintained a vital interest in Cuba-oriented politics and that exile political activities and organizations abounded in Miami during the early years of exile.

Since 1963 there has been a definite change in the exile political scene in Miami. The present situation can be characterized as follows: most Cubans have realized the fruitlessness of continued engagement in exile political organizations. Their time and energy has been redirected toward adapting to a new life and building economic security for themselves and their families. For the most part Cuban exiles in Miami have set aside their original political involvement, but we can expect that these same Cubans will develop other political interests in the years to come. It is suggested here that once the exile has become more fully integrated into the American social and economic milieu, his political traits will again be

manifested, and this time they will be directed toward participation in the American political process.

In anticipation of this forthcoming political involvement, the focus of this study will now be shifted towards exile attitudes, views, and opinions on specific and current political topics. Once this has been accomplished, the major task of this research will have been completed and a political profile of the Cuban exiles in Miami should emerge which will furnish insights into their future political behavior.

CHAPTER IX

THE DISPOSITIONS OF CUBAN EXILES ON SELECTED  
SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES

The remainder of this study deals with the opinions held by Cuban exiles on specific political and social issues. It is assumed that most Cubans in Miami are staunchly anti-communist due to the fact that they are exiles from a homeland that apparently has many of the trappings of a communist state. The degree of their anti-communist leanings is, therefore, a pertinent topic of investigation, and this chapter begins by probing this particular subject. Also treated here are exile dispositions on questions dealing with international relations and race relations.

Exile Dispositions on Communism

Dispositions of exiles toward  
the treatment of communists  
should Castro be overthrown

A very good example of the intensity of anti-communist feelings among exiles can be seen in a study undertaken by El Tiempo Magazine in August of 1968. This survey attempted to probe the feeling of exiles concerning the treatment of communists should Castro be overthrown. According to the survey,

All these interviewed agreed 100 per cent that the death penalty was due, upon Castro's defeat, for the verdict of treason; the same percentage agreed that members of the militia and members of the Communist Party should be punished with forced labor and the withdrawal of civil rights.

Todos los consulados coincidieron en un cien por ciento en que se debe de aplicar la pena de muerte, tras la caída de Castro, por delitos de la patria y esta misma proporción se manifiesta al opinar que los milicianos y miembros del Partido Comunista deben ser castigados con trabajos obligatorios e inhabilitación civil.<sup>1</sup>

Some of the personal comments cited in the El Tiempo study are worthy of mention: "Let there not be even a shadow left of the Communist Party and the likes of it!" said one respondent; another said: "The traitor should not live!"<sup>2</sup> One Cuban who evidently is still intent on returning to Cuba said: "We will return and will render accounts to all those who actively and consciously have violated and strangled our homeland, even if the Americans should not want us to."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ernesto Freyre and Pepin Bosch, "Como Siente y Piensa el Pueblo Cubano en el Exilio," El Tiempo (New York: August 9, 1968). Trans. by Patrick L. Gallagher.

<sup>2</sup>Original: "Del Partido Comunista y similares, que no quede ni sombra!" Said one respondent; another said: "El traidor no debe de vivir!" Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher.

<sup>3</sup>Original: "Nosotros regresaremos y les pasaremos las cuentas a todos los que activa y conscientemente han violado y estrangulado nuestra patria, aunque los americanos no quieran." Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher.



Exile dispositions on the  
position taken by the  
Catholic Church toward  
Cuba

The attitude of the Cuban exile concerning the Catholic Church's position of accommodation toward the Castro government in Cuba proved helpful in the attempt to analyze the anti-communist sentiments of the refugee community. A brief survey of Church-State relations in post-Castro Cuba will help towards appreciation of exile sentiment on this issue.

In the spring of 1963, when the Cuban Ambassador to Canada was addressing the student body of Loyola College in Montreal, a Theology student posed the following question: "If Cuba is a predominantly Catholic country, how can it be communist?"<sup>4</sup> The Ambassador appeared somewhat confused by the student's question. He answered that he as well as his family were both communist and Catholic. He proceeded to say that there was no conflict in Cuba between church and state. This incident points out the anomaly that exists today in the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Castro regime.<sup>5</sup> The Ambassador's insinuation of

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<sup>4</sup>The writer was a student at Loyola College when the Ambassador visited in the Spring of 1963.

<sup>5</sup>The anomaly referred to here is that Roman Catholicism has traditionally stood as a bulwark against atheistic marxism. In the case of Cuba, however, the Vatican has continued diplomatic relations with Castro, has refused to excommunicate Cuban officials, and in recent years has supported some of the activities of the revolutionary government.

perfect church-state harmony in Cuba will be shown here to be a misrepresentation of the facts. It is true, however, that the Vatican maintains diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba and there is an apparent rapprochement between the Cuban hierarchy and Castro's revolutionary government.

The Church's initial position as regards the Revolution, in the words of Claude Julien, was one of "withdrawing into a prudent silence broken on rare occasions by rather unimportant statements."<sup>6</sup> On January 20, 1960, Castro began to criticize the church by berating the "reactionary" and "counter-revolutionary" elements among the clergy. At the same time the Church began to be more vocal about the inroads of communism in Cuba. Tension mounted between the Church and Castro, and on August 7, the Cuban hierarchy released a critical pastoral letter concerning communist influence in the Castro regime. On May 1, 1961, Castro retaliated against what he called the "fascist" Spanish clergy (two-thirds of the clergy in Cuba was from Spain) by nationalizing without compensation all private schools, the greater majority of which were Catholic. The Church has since had all of its property nationalized with the exception of buildings in which religious services are conducted. Finally, following

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<sup>6</sup>Dewart, *op. cit.*, p. 186 quoting Claude Julien, "Church and State in Cuba: Development of a Conflict," Cross Currents, XI, 2, Spring, 1961.

an anti-communist demonstration in front of the Havana Cathedral, there was a massive expulsion of Spanish priests. Auxiliary Bishop Eduardo Boza Masvidal, although a Cuban, was also deported to Spain at this time.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently, throngs of Cuban and Spanish priests and nuns, fearing further reprisals, left the island. More than four-fifths of the nuns and about 400 priests went into exile. By 1964, of the original 700 priests who had been in Cuba, less than 200 remained.<sup>8</sup>

What immediately followed can be termed an uneasy peace between church and state in Cuba. Castro repeatedly denied that religions would be persecuted; and although religious schools were abolished, religion could still be taught in the home and in the churches. Due to the fact, however, that the Catholic Church had undergone what some might term "persecution" at the hands of the Castro government and particularly after so many hundreds of priests were deported, many Cuban exiles expected that the Vatican would take an official position of opposition to the Castro government. This was certainly not an unreasonable expectation since in 1955 the Church had excommunicated Juan Perón for carrying out repressive measures against the

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<sup>7</sup>Archbishop B. Masvidal, prior to Castro's takeover had been instrumental in acquiring Castro's release from prison after being sentenced by a Batista Court.

<sup>8</sup>Mecham, op. cit., p. 304.

Church in Argentina. A similar action occurred when Rome censored the government of Haiti for actions similar to Castro's. The Cuban government, however, was never officially reprimanded by Rome, and, as mentioned above, diplomatic relations between Castro and the Vatican continue to exist. It can be said further that the rift between the Church and Castro's government that was apparent during the early days of the revolution is evidently being mended. The indication of a reconciliation can be seen in the statement by the Vatican's Charge D'Affairs in Cuba, Monsignor Cesare Zacchi. Concerning the church-state relationship in Cuba, he tells us the following:

Cuba is the first socialist country in which peaceful co-existence between the state and the Catholic Church can be described in more precise and correct terms, because actually what we have is a joint<sup>9</sup> action in any work for the benefit of the people.

People in Cuban government circles seem to have a great deal of respect for the Vatican Charge D'Affairs. Castro himself has said of Zacchi that "he (Zacchi) understands perfectly the social changes developed in this country."<sup>10</sup>

The apparent rapprochement between Cuba and the Catholic Church is further seen in recent statements coming from Latin American and Cuban bishops.

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<sup>9</sup>Susan Beverly, America, September 21, 1968.

<sup>10</sup>Kyle Haselden, "The Church in Cuba," The Christian Century (Chicago: January 31, 1968), p. 131.

Archbishop Helder Camara of Recife, Brazil, at the annual Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program's meeting in 1969, appealed to all Catholics to seek an end to the Organization of American States' ostracism of Cuba which, in the words of the Archbishop, is based upon "sterile hate."<sup>11</sup> The eight active Cuban Bishops, including the Archbishop of Havana, addressed themselves to the Organization of American States' trade embargo of Cuba in a pastoral letter in April of 1969. The Bishops said:

In seeking the common good of our people and of our faithful and in serving the poor among them . . . we denounce the unjust conditions of the blockade, which is contributing to unnecessary suffering and to making all efforts at development difficult.<sup>12</sup>

In August, 1970, another joint pastoral letter was issued by Cuban Bishops which dealt with the question of cooperation with atheists. It stated:

Contemporary atheism is a reality that we cannot ignore or judge in a simplistic manner. . . . Christians should not refuse to cooperate with a man simply because he does not believe in God. . . . Men of good will have many things in common, be they atheists or believers.<sup>13</sup>

The question now arises as to how the Cuban exile reacts to the position that the Church has taken

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<sup>11</sup>New York Times, January 27, 1969, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>Pastoral letter by the Cuban Bishops, quoted in National Catholic Reporter, ed. Robert Hoyt (Kansas City, Mo.: May 7, 1969), p. 5.

<sup>13</sup>Pastoral letter by the Cuban Bishops, quoted in the Catholic Almanac, ed. Felicia A. Foy (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony's Guild, 1971), pp. 93-94.

towards the communist government of Cuba. As previously stated, it can be assumed that the majority of Cuban refugees maintain anti-Castro and anti-communist sentiments. At the same time most exiles are affiliated to one degree or another with the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>14</sup> The accommodating position of the Church vis-a-vis the Castro government must create for many exiles certain conflict of values. It was found during the course of this study that refugees often express consternation on the stand taken by the Church. This concern is deepened by the fact that they consider their flight from communism as being synonymous with a flight from anti-God forces. It is common, for example, to hear staunch denunciations of "atheistic communism" from the pulpits of exile priests in Miami's Catholic Churches.<sup>15</sup> Religious observances held every year to honor "La Caridad del Cobre" (Our Lady of Cobre) Cuba's patroness, bemoan the fact that Cuba is still "enslaved" by communism.<sup>16</sup> Refugees pray that the patroness of Cuba, whom they consider still to be theirs, will help rid

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<sup>14</sup>Of the group used in this study, 92 per cent identified themselves as being Roman Catholic.

<sup>15</sup>The writer attended several Spanish Masses in different Catholic Churches in Miami over a period of two years.

<sup>16</sup>The writer attended a Spanish Mass at the Miami Stadium attended by thousands of Cubans in the summer of 1960. Following the Mass, an exile priest exhibited a statue smuggled out of Cuba of "La Caridad del Cobre." The priest referred to the statue as now sharing the state of exile with the other refugees.

them of the communist evil.

Many exiles, at least in the early days when they continued to nurture the dream of returning to Cuba, put confidence in God and in their religion to help them weather the hardships of exile and eventually regain their homeland. Vila and Zalamea say of the refugee the following:

In God he has placed his hope of standing again on the soil of his homeland which is today stained and whose only owner should be He, the Almighty.

En Dios ha puesto su esperanza de pasar de nuevo el suelo de su patria, hoy mancillada, donde el único dueño ha de ser Aquel que todo lo puede.<sup>17</sup>

The extent of the exile community's dissatisfaction with the Church's position is evident. Nearly one out of three of the Catholic refugees questioned stated that they were so upset with the Church's stance on Cuba that it makes them question their loyalty to Catholicism. Many personal comments on this matter were offered which characterize the respondents' opposition to the Church. One of the lawyers interviewed, for example, stated that communists have surely infiltrated the Cuban hierarchy and probably even the Vatican itself. Another respondent said that the Church's position was "par for the course" and that it was in line with the long-range liberal plans to which the Church had committed itself over the past several years.

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<sup>17</sup>Vila and Zalamea, *Exilio*, op. cit., p. 362. Translation by Patrick L. Gallagher.

He could no longer agree with the liberal goals of the Church, and because of these goals he no longer felt any allegiance to the Church. One elderly lady from a renowned Cuban family recounted an incident dating back to 1962 in which she personally saw several young priests being humiliated by Castro forces. She was so incensed by the event that she complained to the Cuban hierarchy and wrote a letter to the Vatican, hoping to cause a reaction on the part of the Church which would demand redress from the Castro government. Due to what she termed the "indifference" of the Church to the "horrible" state of affairs in Cuba, this lady, who had been a practicing Catholic for some sixty-five years, left the Catholic Church after coming into exile and joined a Protestant sect.

One last example of exile opinion on Church-state relations in Cuba is seen in the case of a very well-known and respected Cuban physician. This man stated that his loyalty to the Church was not yet in question since he was sure that the Church was not really as "soft" on communism as its actions might denote. He explained that he was quite certain there was some type of secret pact between the Church and the United States State Department through which an agreement was made for the Church to support the Castro government temporarily. At a designated point, however, according to his analysis, the Church will join forces



with the United States government in order to effect the overthrow of Castro.

The relatively high percentage of exiles upset enough with the Catholic Church's stand on Cuba to cause them to question their loyalty to this religious institution to which they have been at least nominally and culturally attached for their entire lives is indicative of an intense anti-communist attitude. Should the Church continue in its conciliatory attitude towards Castro, this might cause even further disenchantment among the exile population.

The exiles' comparison of their own feelings on communism to those which they interpret most North Americans as having

A frequent view expressed by Cuban exiles is that due to their personal experience with communism they are better equipped to evaluate its dangers than are most North Americans. They feel that Americans are often misguided and naive about the pitfalls of communism. In an attempt to quantify this disposition and thereby obtain a fuller insight into the extent of the anti-communist sentiments of exiles, the following question was posed: As concerns your attitude towards communism, would you say that you are: More anti-communist than most Americans? Less anti-communist than most Americans? About as anti-communist as most Americans?

TABLE 13.--A comparison of degrees of anti-communism among exiles and North Americans, as perceived by the exile community

	Professionals	Students
More anti-communist than most Americans	88%	81%
Less anti-communist than most Americans	0	5
About the same as most Americans	12	14

There was a greater consensus among the respondents on this question than on any other subject dealt with in the questionnaire. There was practically no variation among the different professional subgroups, and very little variation among the various student subgroups, the only exception being that a slightly higher percentage of high school students felt that their opinion about communism is the same as most Americans.

The students' comparison of their own feelings toward communism to those which they interpret most older Cubans as having

Many young Cubans surveyed expressed the opinion that one recurring problem of family relations in the exile home is the "obsession" of older Cubans with communism. In order to ascertain the extent of this problem, another question aimed at a comparative

attitude evaluation was addressed exclusively to the younger group, the students: As concerns your attitude towards communism, would you say that you are: More anti-communist than most older Cubans? Less anti-communist than most older Cubans? About the same as most older Cubans?

TABLE 14.--A comparison of degrees of anti-communism among older Cubans and younger Cubans as perceived by the student group

More anti-communist than most older Cubans	7%
Less anti-communist than most older Cubans	47
About the same as most older Cubans	46

A significantly high number of the students surveyed perceive that they are less anti-communist than their elders. Numerous personal remarks were made by these students which expressed their feelings. One said the following of older Cubans: "They are very prejudiced against communists, and anything different they call it communist." Another student related that she felt older Cubans were obsessed by anti-communist attitudes not so much on ideological grounds but mainly because communism had deprived them of their material belongings. These figures, through which the students compare their feelings toward communism with those which they believe are held by older Cubans, indicate

that there is a sizeable attitude-variance within the Cuban community based on age.

Political activities of the exiles denoting their anti-communist ideology

There are numerous examples of Cuban exile political activities in Miami which demonstrate anti-communist sentiments. One such example is seen in the case which involved the Miami showing of two National Educational Television productions. These films had been made in communist Cuba. After the showing of the first film, exiles formed a pressure group to protest the film and to refute the message, which they felt was favorable to Castro. Exiles picketed the television stations planning to show the film, and they encouraged Cubans and North Americans to protest the films through a letter-writing campaign. The second film was never televised in Miami due to this exile pressure.<sup>18</sup>

Often Cubans in Miami react to policies of communist governments other than Castro's. In August, 1968, a large group of Cubans staged a rally at Bay-front Park in Miami to protest the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In addition to hearing impassioned speeches--one in Spanish by a former Hungarian Freedom Fighter--the highly emotional throng burned one Russian flag and

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<sup>18</sup>Burt and Bohning, op. cit., p. 6B, Col. 1.

spat on and ripped apart another after police stopped them from setting fire to it on the sidewalk.<sup>19</sup>

From time to time, terrorist organizations have emerged from within the Cuban community.<sup>20</sup> These groups invariably champion the cause of destroying communism. During the course of 1968, over forty bombings occurred in Miami,<sup>21</sup> which were all directed towards governments and individuals who trade with Castro. One of the most notorious events was the shelling of a Polish freighter by an exile group while it was docked at the Miami harbor. Such terrorist groups represent only a fringe element of the Cuban community; for the most part, exiles content themselves with verbal denunciations of communism.

Cuban exile periodicals treat world affairs at some length, and judging from conversations with many refugees during the course of this research, Cubans seem to be reasonably well informed on world events. Often Cuban parents comment that in their opinion the primary and secondary schools in pre-Castro Cuba stressed subjects such as world geography and world history to a greater extent than do the Miami schools

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<sup>19</sup> Frank Soler, "200 Cuban Exiles Protest Czechoslovakia Invasion," Miami Herald, August 23, 1968, p. 11B.

<sup>20</sup> See Appendix II for a list of some of the terrorist groups that have been active in the past years.

<sup>21</sup> Center . . . , Psycho-Social . . . , p. 104.

attended by their children. If this evaluation is true, perhaps the Cuban educational background is partly responsible for the interest of exiles in international affairs. As might be expected from data already presented on the Cuban exile, the aspects of international affairs to which refugees are most attuned have to do with communism. This study now proceeds to analyze one aspect of international relations which is of paramount interest to Cuban refugees--namely the question of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba.

Disposition of Cuban Exiles on United States--  
Cuban Relations

The arrival of Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan in Cuba on February 4, 1960, and the subsequent signing of the first Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement was one of the first in a series of events which led to the breaking of traditional economic and diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba. Finally, in June of that same year, after Cuba nationalized all American-owned properties, the United States retaliated with a trade embargo. Relations went from bad to worse, and since January 3, 1961, when President Eisenhower severed diplomatic and consular relations with Fidel Castro's government, the United States and Cuba have maintained unfriendly and generally hostile relations.

World attention has remained closely attuned to the rift between the super-power and the heretofore insignificant island which dared to challenge her powerful neighbor. In April of 1961, the ill-fated Bay of Pigs Invasion brought to a close one of the chapters in Cuban-United States relations. The United States had failed in an attempt to overthrow Castro by training and backing Cuban exile forces who attempted to regain control of the island.

In August of 1962, United States reconnaissance planes discovered Soviet ground-to-air missiles in Cuba. One of the possible ramifications of this event could have been a United States attack on Cuba aimed at destroying the potential threat of the missiles. On November 4, 1962, however, President Kennedy opted for the so-called "defensive" quarantine of Cuba. The armed forces were put on alert and Kennedy asked Congress for the authorization to call up 150,000 reservists. On October 22, he sparked a confrontation with the Soviet Union by demanding the withdrawal of ballistic missiles from Cuba, at the same time ordering a quarantine of all shipments of offensive military equipment to Cuba. Finally, after frantic negotiations, Premier Khrushchev announced on October 28 that the missiles placed in Cuba were being dismantled and sent back to their place of origin.

The disastrous Bay of Pigs Invasion and the failure of the missile crisis to change the status quo were, as was mentioned previously, sobering events for most of the exiles in Miami: They reluctantly came to the realization that a reversal of the political situation in Cuba was very unlikely. Exiles continue to follow with great interest, however, all aspects of Cuba's relations with the world, anticipating that Castro's continued success or ultimate failure depends greatly on the world situation. The study group was asked the following question: How would you feel about the United States reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba and lifting the trade embargo?

TABLE 15.--A comparison of degrees of opposition to the question of reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba and lifting the trade embargo as perceived by the exile community

	Professionals	Students
Definitely opposed	79%	62%
Unsure of feelings	15	30
Unopposed	6	8

It is clear that the majority of exiles are definitely opposed to the resumption of diplomatic and trade relations between Cuba and the United States. Since the re-establishment of normal relations between Cuba and the United States could very likely become an issue in



American politics in the future, an in-depth analysis of the responses to this question is warranted here.

### The variables

Sex and occupation do not appear to be significant factors in the responses to the above question; the age factor, however, seems relevant. Seventeen per cent more professionals than students were definitely opposed to the resumption of United States-Cuban relations. It is also noted that the students voiced a significantly higher percentage of "unsure" and "unopposed" feelings than did the professionals. Thirty-nine per cent of the students as compared to twenty-one per cent of the professionals chose definitely not to oppose a potential reconciliation between the United States and Castro's Cuba.

Within the different subgroups of the student category there was some variation in the responses to this question. Ten per cent more college and graduate students than high school students were opposed to the resumption of relations with Cuba. This variation, like the student-professional variation cited above, is probably due to age. The high school group, due to the fact that they left Cuba at a much earlier age than the college and graduate school group, is probably less attached to Cuba and, therefore, less interested in combatting the Castro government by isolating it diplomatically and hindering it with a trade embargo.

Through the cross tabulation of the student responses on the question of future ties between the United States and Cuba with various other questions, several other significant variables were isolated.

The significance of domicile patterns.--It was found that 70 per cent of the students who live in predominantly Cuban neighborhoods are definitely opposed to the resumption of normal relations between the United States and Cuba. Less than half (42 per cent) of the students who live in predominantly American neighborhoods or mixed United States-Cuban neighborhoods are definitely opposed to normal Cuba-United States relations.

The significance of membership in exile political associations.--Thirty four per cent of the students who are definitely opposed to the United States reestablishing relations with Cuba belong to exile political associations.<sup>22</sup> Of the students who were not definitely opposed to the renewal of United States-Cuban diplomatic ties, only eight per cent (the same as the general student percentage) said that they belonged to exile political movements.

The significance of the desire to return to Cuba.--Seventy two per cent of the students definitely opposed to the United States resuming diplomatic

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<sup>22</sup>It should be recalled that only eight per cent of the entire student group stated that they belonged to exile political groups.

relations with Cuba and lifting the trade embargo revealed that they would definitely return to Cuba should Castro fall from power.<sup>23</sup> Only 17 per cent of the students who were not definitely opposed to the resumption of United States-Cuban ties have a definite desire to return to Cuba.

It has been shown above that the majority of Cuban exiles are opposed to the lifting of the embargo on Cuba and also to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba. The minority who did not express definite opposition to future United States-Cuban ties included a higher percentage of younger Cubans than older Cubans. It was also found that those students who held a less rigid position on the question show a greater tendency to live in mixed or predominantly American neighborhoods than do the students holding to a more rigid position; they also have a lower rate of participation in exile political organizations and less desire to return to Cuba than the students who are firm in their opposition to future United States-Cuban relations. They are perhaps thoroughly integrated into the American way of life and as such show little interest in isolating Cuba diplomatically from the United States.

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<sup>23</sup> Only 24 per cent of the entire group said they would definitely return to Cuba.

The Dispositions of Exiles Toward Race  
Relations in the United States

Studying the possible role of exiles in American politics, one is reminded that politics is not a simple phenomenon: Cubans take a stand usually thought of as conservative on all issues related to communism. It will be shown here, on the other hand, that evidence suggests that they will take what is commonly considered a liberal stand on the race issue. This anomaly is cited by Psycho-Social Dynamics in the following words: "Exile Cubans almost have a compulsive need to proclaim their conservatism, particularly in regard to Castro and communists, but in actuality, Cubans have far greater propensity towards social liberalism than they dare profess."<sup>24</sup>

While it is true that few Cubans have participated in United States elections, still, among those who have, there is often an expression of liberalism as long as the issue of communism is not injected. An example of this is seen in a voting study conducted in predominantly Cuban precincts. Cuban voters showed far more propensity towards supporting negro candidates than did most North American voters:

In the democratic primary race for the State House of Representatives between Joe Kershaw, a Negro, and Stephen Butler, his white opponent, the predominantly Cuban precincts voted for Butler by an extremely close margin, 50.3% to 49.7%. In the non-partisan County Commission race between Earl

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<sup>24</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social . . . , p. 72.

Caroll, a Negro, and R. B. Fordyce, his white opponent, the same "Cuban precincts cast a 54% vote for Fordyce."<sup>25</sup>

A liberal view of the race issue by exile Cubans was again discussed in the study mentioned above. Material gathered from the principals of Catholic and public schools in Dade County showed that the "social acceptance of the Negro by the Cuban in school was greater than by the white American."<sup>26</sup> The same study also pointed out that Cuban Negroes in Miami are socially accepted by white Cubans, and that they are found living in predominantly white Cuban neighborhoods.<sup>27</sup> Another study pointed out that "in factories and other places visited, Cubans and Negroes were found to be working in harmony and comraderie."<sup>28</sup> This latter study proceeded to say that in the Cuban neighborhoods adjoining Negro sections, no racial problems were found to exist.<sup>29</sup>

In order to obtain further insight into the Cuban attitude on race relations, the following question was asked: Regarding racial integration (housing, schooling, etc.) would you say that you would accept

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 72-73.

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of pre-Castro race relations in Cuba, refer to Chapter VII on Cuban exile political culture and Cuban nationalism, p. 98.

<sup>28</sup> Center . . . , The Cuban Immigration . . . , p. 21.

<sup>29</sup> Center . . . , Psycho-Social . . . , p. 93.

integration more readily than most white Americans?  
 Fell about the same concerning integration as most  
 white Americans? Be more opposed to integration than  
 most white Americans?

TABLE 16.--An estimation of the degrees of acceptance  
 of racial integration (housing,  
 schooling, etc.) by the  
 exile community

Accept integration more readily than most white Americans	53 %
Fell about the same concerning integration as most white Americans	42.5
Be more opposed to integration than most white Americans	4.5

Clearly over half of the exiles in the study group feel they are more liberally oriented on the race issue than most white Americans. It is possible that these figures would have been even higher had it not been for an outbreak of racial violence that occurred in Miami in 1968. In many interviews exiles indicated a fear of American Negroes and were quick to make a distinction between Cuban Negroes and American Negroes. They pointed out that they had never witnessed violence among Negroes in Cuba such as they have witnessed among American Negroes. In an attempt to quantify the differing attitudes, the exiles were asked whether they would prefer to integrate with Cuban Negroes or with American Negroes. Fifty-three per cent said it did not

matter whether they were Cuban Negroes or American Negroes; 17 per cent expressed preference towards integration with American Negroes, and 46 per cent said they would prefer integrating with Cuban Negroes. The opinion that many exiles have toward the American Negro is expressed by one of the participants of this study in the following words: "Today because of his hatred for the white the American Negro is exaggerating the issue."

### Conclusion

If the exiles are correct in the comparison that they make between their own feelings on the race issue and the feelings of most Americans, it can be anticipated that the future Cuban-American vote on race issues will have a liberal bent.

## CHAPTER X

### THE POLITICAL PROFILE OF THE CUBAN EXILE:

#### A SUMMARY

The central purpose of this study has been to analyze the political orientations and activities of the Cuban exile community. It is hoped that the political profile which has been presented will shed light on the present status of the exiles as political beings and suggests what is in store for the future; Cuban exiles are viewed as a potential political interest group in Miami/Florida politics.

Admittedly the circumstances of exile are not entirely conducive to integration into the political life of a host nation. An exile has not freely chosen to abandon his mother country and to integrate himself into an adopted nation. It seems to be a common phenomenon of refugee psychology to hold tightly to the past, thereby resisting the cultural influences of a new life. But regardless of "built in" hinderances to adaptation, Cuban exiles seem to be fast approaching a status which will encourage their involvement in Miami/Florida politics. Their state of adaptation can be partly explained by factors made evident in this study.



The historical, sociological and economic data presented in Part II is considered essential for understanding the real and potential roles of the Cuban exile.

It was shown that Florida has offered to Cubans throughout their history a convenient escape hatch from the turbulence which has often characterized Cuban politics. Undoubtedly, the consciousness that many of their countrymen before them had undergone the same experience made the trauma of exile more bearable: their awareness that many thousands of Cubans were already living in Miami and other areas of the Florida peninsula helped to soften the blow of abandoning their homeland. This, added to the fact that the scenic and climatic environment of Miami is very similar to that in Cuba, made Miami a home away from home.

Another aspect of adaptation for Cuban refugees has been their rapid socio-economic progress. There is a consensus among those who have studied the Cuban exiles that they have become a stable element of the Miami milieu, and have contributed to the community in many ways.

The data also showed political adaptation to life in the United States to be feasible: Cuban exiles residing in Miami appear to be disposed to remaining in the United States and becoming members of its political system.

If the data presented here are valid, Miami will continue to have a large Cuban population regardless of the situation in Cuba. These Cubans will become American citizens, and they will probably express their interests by forming political interest groups built along ethnic lines.

The profile was further expanded by a discussion of the political culture of the exiles. Cuban history shows a mixed subject-oriented and participant-oriented political culture. It is obvious that Cuban exiles in Miami prefer to have their lives totally uprooted rather than conform to Castro's rule in Cuba, and they have already shown that they are prepared to pursue their political goals even as refugees. Political involvement was vividly apparent during the early years of exile when many refugees dedicated themselves to the overthrow of Castro in Havana. Finally, it was demonstrated that Miami Cubans came to the realization that energy spent on the anti-Castro goals of exile political organizations was wasted, thus most of the Cuban exile population in Miami eventually withdrew from all political activities associated with these groups.

Attention was turned next towards the ideological leanings of the refugee population. It was seen that Cubans are still highly interested in political issues and themes. It was predicted, on the strength of the previous findings, that after the refugees have

adapted more fully to their exile environment and have become formal participants in the American political process, they will openly and actively express their political leanings. They can be expected to maintain a strong stance against communism. This will affect their views on domestic as well as foreign policy, and will probably continue to orient them towards the Republican Party, which they view as more anti-communist than the Democratic Party.

Although a conservative stand on communism is to be expected, there is evidence of liberal leanings on racial questions in the United States. Due to their cultural heritage, Cuban-Americans will most likely manifest a more open-minded position here than that held by most white North Americans.

This political profile of the Cuban exile is admittedly rudimentary; this is but a first effort. A more detailed analysis must await the time when a larger portion of the exile community actually becomes involved in the American political process and more exacting empirical effort is possible. Hopefully the hypotheses presented here are enticing enough to foster research which will more nearly complete the story of the political nature of the Miami Cuban exile.

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## APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX I

The following are tables showing the individual questions asked in the questionnaire, with the replies in the form of percentages (composite, professional and student scores).

TABLE 1.--How long have you been in this country?

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Since before the Castro Revolution	5 %	4 %	6.5%
2) Five to ten years	85.5	81.5	87
3) Two to four years	6.5	9.5	4
4) Less than two years	3	5	2.5

TABLE 2.--Do you live in a:

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Rented house	44 %	44 %	44 %
2) House owned by you or your family	56	56	56

TABLE 3.--Do you live in a:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Predominantly Cuban neighborhood	17.5%	18%	17%
2) Predominantly American neighborhood	43	41	45
3) About equally mixed Cuban-American neighborhood	39.5	41	38

TABLE 4.--Would you say that the majority of your friends are:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Cuban	68%	77%	60%
2) American	5	3	7
3) About equal numbers of Cubans and Americans	27	20	33

TABLE 5.--Do you find it:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Easier to make friends with Cubans	39%	43%	33.5%
2) Easier to make friends with Americans	5	3	7
3) About the same degree of ease in making friends with Americans and Cubans	56	54	59.5

TABLE 6.--Do you feel as though there is much discrimination against Cubans in Miami?

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Yes, quite a bit	5%	5%	6 %
2) Some	44	40	47.5
3) Practically none	40	41	38.5
4) None at all	11	14	8

TABLE 7.--Have you ever felt as though you were discriminated against because you are Cuban?

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Often	12%	10%	12.5%
2) Hardly ever	47	39	55.5
3) Never	41	51	32

TABLE 8.--Concerning "el ambiente de la Saguesera" (the environment of the Southwest section), would you say that:

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) You enjoy it a great deal	7.5%	6.5%	8%
2) You enjoy it in some respects	42	52.5	32
3) You do not enjoy it	26	26	26
4) You are somewhat ashamed of it	24.5	15	34



TABLE 9.--Would you prefer patronizing:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Cuban businesses	20 %	24 %	16 %
2) American businesses	10	7	13
3) It doesn't matter	70	69	71

TABLE 10.--In which language do you feel that you can most fully express your thoughts?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) English	20 %	3 %	36 %
2) Spanish	50	69.5	31
3) It doesn't matter	30	27.5	33

TABLE 11.--As concerns your culture and your way of thinking, would you say that you are:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) More Cuban than American	57.5%	70 %	45 %
2) More American than Cuban	12	1.5	22
3) About an equal mixture of American and Cuban	30.5	28.5	33

TABLE 12.--Concerning your children or future children, will you:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Definitely want them to learn Spanish	78 %	79 %	78 %
2) Prefer that they learn Spanish	16.5	16	6
3) It doesn't matter	5.5	5	16

TABLE 13.--Professionals: Concerning dating practices of young Cubans, do you feel as though the chaperone system should be continued in this country?

Students: Concerning dating practices, would you say that the majority of your unmarried Cuban friends use the chaperone custom?

	Professionals	Students
1) Yes	52%	42%
2) No	29	58
3) Perhaps*	19	

\*The word "perhaps" was not offered as an alternative in the student questionnaire.

TABLE 14.--On the sexual attitudes and behavior of Cuban girls:

Professionals: Do you have fear that unmarried Cuban exile girls will become too liberal concerning sexual attitudes and behavior while living in the U.S.?

1) Yes	49%
2) No	26
3) Perhaps	25

Students: Concerning sexual attitudes and behavior, would you say that the majority of Cuban girls of your generation are:

1) More traditional than the average American girl	80%
2) Less traditional than the average American girl	5
3) About the same as the average American girl	15

TABLE 15.--Professionals: Do you feel as though the teenage Cuban boy living in the U.S. is becoming somewhat less masculine than he would be if he had been raised in a non-communist Cuba?

1) Yes	15%
2) No	75
3) Perhaps	10

Students: Would you say that the concept of "el macho" among Cuban males is:

1) Less stressed among your generation than among older Cubans	60%
2) More stressed among your generation than among older Cubans	12
3) About the same degree of stress in both generations	28

TABLE 16.--Do you listen mainly to:

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Cuban radio stations	12%	18%	5%
2) American radio stations	58	32	84
3) About equal listening to Cuban and American radio stations	30	50	11

TABLE 17.--Would you say that you prefer:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Cuban music	28%	43%	12%
2) American music	34	7	62
3) No preference	38	50	26

TABLE 18.--Would you be opposed to becoming an American citizen?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Yes	9%	5%	12%
2) No	91	95	88

TABLE 19.--If you should become an American citizen, would you say that it would be:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Primarily for economic or legal advantages	25%	17.5%	33.5%
2) Primarily for patriotism for the U.S.	6	4.5	6.5
3) A mixture of both	35	28	41
4) "The reasonable thing to do"	34	50	19

TABLE 20.--To what extent would you say that the Cuban environment of Miami influenced your decision to live here?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Great influence	38%	47.5%	29%
2) Some influence	27	22.5	32
3) Minor influence	13	8	17
4) No influence	22	22	22

TABLE 21.--Do you now belong to, or plan to join, an exile political organization or party?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Yes	11%	14%	8%
2) No	89	86	92

TABLE 22.--Do you now (or do you think that in the future you might) belong to a Cuban exile professional, civic or social organization?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Yes	49%	69%	28%
2) No	51	31	72

TABLE 23.--Would you say that the majority of your Cuban exile friends are:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Practicing Catholics	58%	62%	55%
2) Catholics in name only	40	36	43
3) Not Catholics	1	2	2

TABLE 24.--Would you think that the majority of Cuban exiles are:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) More dedicated to religion in exile than they were in Cuba	29%	36 %	21.5%
2) Less dedicated to religion in exile than they were in Cuba	21	13.5	28.5
3) About the same degree of dedication	50	50.5	50

TABLE 25.--How do you feel about the Vatican continuing diplomatic relations with Cuba?

Composite Professionals Students			
1) It makes me question my loyalty to Catholicism	21%	19.5%	23%
2) It has no effect on my loyalty to Catholicism	70	71	68
3) It does not concern me because I am not a Catholic	9	9.5	9

TABLE 26.--How do you feel about the recent statements of Cuban Bishops now in Cuba and certain other American and Latin American clergymen who seem to foster lifting the embargo on trade to Cuba?

Composite Professionals Students			
1) It makes me question my loyalty to Catholicism	26%	21%	27.5%
2) It has no effect on my loyalty to Catholicism	66	71	62.5
3) It does not concern me because I am not a Catholic	8	8	10



TABLE 27.--Do you think that the majority of Cuban children are overprotected by their parents?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Yes	54%	54%	55%
2) No	46	46	45

TABLE 28.--Would you think that there is:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) More of a generation gap between Cuban parents and their children than vice-versa	27%	18.5%	36%
2) Less of a generation gap between Cuban parents and their children than vice-versa	42	49	35
3) About the same generation gap in the case of Cubans as in Americans	31	32.5	29

TABLE 29.--Would you say that you prefer:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) The close family ties often found among Cuban families	90%	98%	83%
2) The loose family ties often found among American families	10	2	17

TABLE 30.--Would you hope that Cuban exile children will be raised:

	Professionals	Students
1) More according to Cuban standards of child-rearing	74.5%	66%
2) More according to American standards of child-rearing	25.5	34

TABLE 31.--If communism should be defeated in Cuba, how would you feel about returning to Cuba?

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Would definitely return with intention of making Cuba my home	29%	35.5%	24%
2) Might return with the intention of making Cuba my home	45	44.5	45
3) Would not return with the intention of making Cuba my home	26	20	31

TABLE 32.--If communism should be defeated in Cuba, how do you think the majority of your age group Cubans would feel about returning to Cuba?

	Professionals	Students
1) Would definitely return with intention of making Cuba their home	33.5%	8%
2) Might return with the intention of making Cuba their home	55	64
3) Would not return with intention of making Cuba their home	11.5	28

TABLE 33.--If communism should be defeated in Cuba, how do you think the majority of \_\_\_\_\_ \* Cubans would feel about returning to Cuba?

	Professionals	Students
1) Would definitely return with intention of making Cuba their home	6%	69.5%
2) Might return with the intention of making Cuba their home	49	27
3) Would not return with intention of making Cuba their home	45	3.5

\*In student questionnaire, the word "older" was placed at this point in the question, and in the professional questionnaire, the word "younger" was used.

TABLE 34.--What percentage of the Cuban population now living in the U.S. do you feel would return to Cuba should communism be defeated?

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) 75% or more	20%	19.5%	22%
2) from 50% to 75%	43	36	49
3) from 25% to 50%	31	37.5	24
4) less than 25%	6	7	5

TABLE 35.--Concerning the need for social reform in Cuba prior to 1959, would you say that Cuba needed:

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Revolutionary reform	14%	3%	24%
2) Extensive reform	48	45	51
3) Little reform	32	44	21
4) No reform	6	8	4

TABLE 36.--How would you feel about the U.S. reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba and lifting the embargo?

	Composite	Professionals	Students
1) Definitely opposed	69.5%	79%	61%
2) Unsure of my feelings	22.5	15	30
3) Unopposed	8	6	9

TABLE 37.--How do you think most\* Cubans that you know would feel about the U.S. reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba and lifting the embargo?

	Professionals	Students
1) Definitely opposed	90%	86%
2) Unsure of their feelings	8	10
3) Unopposed	2	4

\*In student questionnaire the word "older" was added to the question at this point.

TABLE 38.--Would you say that in your feelings toward communism that you are:

	Professionals	Students
1) More anti-communist than most Americans*	88%	81%
2) Less anti-communist than most Americans*	0	5
3) About the same in your feelings toward communism as most Americans*	12	14

\*In student questionnaire, the words "your age" were added to the end of each answer.

TABLE 39.--Regarding racial integration (housing, schooling, etc.), would you say that you would:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Accept integration more readily than most white Americans	53%	60%	45.5%
2) Feel about the same concerning integration as most white Americans	43	37	48.5
3) Be more opposed to integration than most white Americans	4	3	6

TABLE 40.--In a case of an integrated situation, would you prefer integrating with:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Cuban Negroes	46%	48%	43.5%
2) American Negroes	1	0	3
3) It makes no difference whether they are Cuban or American	53	52	53.5

TABLE 41.--Would you say that your family's economic position in Cuba was:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) High income	46%	38.5%	54%
2) Middle income	52	59.5	45
3) Low income	2	2	1

TABLE 42.--If there were Cuban exiles running for political offices in this country, would you say that you would:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Most likely vote for them	46%	24%	18%
2) Perhaps vote for them	52	67	70
3) Probably not vote for them	2	9	12

TABLE 43.--If there are Cuban exiles running for elected offices, would you say that most\* Cubans would:

	Professionals	Students
1) Most likely vote for them	53%	71%
2) Perhaps vote for them	43	28
3) Most probably not vote for them	4	1

\*In student questionnaire, the word "older" was added to the question at this point.

TABLE 44.--How do you expect your future economic status in the U.S. to compare to the economic status you could have reached in Cuba?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Higher status in U.S.	17.5%	17%	18.5%
2) Higher status in Cuba	52	56	47.5
3) The same in U.S. as in Cuba	30.5	27	34

TABLE 45.--Do you feel as though you will be able to make as full a use of your talents in this country as you would have been able to in Cuba?

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Yes	65%	62%	69%
2) Perhaps	21	17	25
3) No	14	21	6

TABLE 46.--Would you say that your family\* annual income in this country:

	Professionals	Students
1) Is over \$16,000	22%	13%
2) Is from \$11,000 to \$15,000	26	27
3) Is from \$6,000 to \$10,000	32	42
4) Is under \$6,000	20	18

\*In student questionnaire, the word "family" was substituted for the word "parents."



TABLE 47.--Do you expect your family\* annual income in the future to be:

	Composite Professionals Students		
1) Over \$16,000	43.5%	43%	43.2%
2) \$11,000 to \$15,000	29	40	34.5
3) \$6,000 to \$10,000	21.5	15	18.3
4) Under \$6,000	6	2	4

\*In student questionnaire the phrase "personal family income (that of you and your future or present spouse)" was substituted for the word "family" at this point.

TABLE 48.--What was your profession in Cuba? (This question asked only of professionals)

1) Medical Doctors	13%
2) Lawyers	19
3) Teachers	32
4) Scientists and Engineers	4
5) Businessmen	7
6) Other Profession	25

TABLE 49.--What is your profession in the U.S.? (This question asked only of professionals)

1) Medical Doctors	11%
2) Lawyers	1
3) Teachers	31
4) Engineers and Scientists	13
5) Businessmen	10
6) Other Profession	34

TABLE 50.--Are you? (This question was asked only of professionals)

1) Over 30 years of age	80%
2) Under 30 years of age	20

TABLE 51.--Are you now studying? (This question was asked only of the college students)

1) Liberal Arts	24%
2) Business	29
3) Engineering	21
4) Science	26

TABLE 52.--Are you?

	Composite Professional Students		
1) Male	59%	57%	61%
2) Female	41	43	39

## APPENDIX II

### CUBAN EXILE POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS PRESENTLY OPERATING IN MIAMI

#### El Ejército Libertador Cubano (The Cuban Liberation Army)

This group was formed in 1969 under the auspices of the Association of the Bay of Pigs Veterans. Its initial aim was to bring the various complexities of Cuban political sentiment together; but from a planned 60,000 rank and file membership predicted by its leader, Salvador Madrugá, only forty or fifty became active.<sup>1</sup>

#### El Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano (The Cuban Nationalist Movement)

This movement is generally characterized as a Neo-Fascist group. A great portion of its leadership is made up of young idealists. They received world attention when their leader, Felipe Rivero, was charged in 1967 with a planned bombing of the Cuban Pavillion at the Montreal Exposition. The Movimiento Nacionalista has also claimed responsibility for a bazooka shelling of the United Nations Building in New York,

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<sup>1</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social . . . , pp. 102-104.

and for various bombings and attempted bombings of Cuban ships docked in foreign ports. Today the movement is said to have no more than a dozen active members.<sup>2</sup>

The Secret Anti-Communist Army in Exile

This group has been engaged in many terrorist activities and conducted supply missions for the underground anti-Castro forces in Cuba. In early 1968 they claimed responsibility for a tear-bomb that exploded during a concert at the Miami Beach Auditorium which was attended mainly by Cubans. Their justification was that "no Cuban has the right to enjoy himself while Castro remains in power in Cuba."<sup>3</sup> In November of 1968, Frank Fiorini, one of the leading commandos of the organization, was arrested along with 12 companions for illegal entry into Belize, British Honduras, after being detoured from their voyage to Cuba due to boat trouble. The group supposedly has bases in Mexico, and in 1968 its leader, Francisco Quesada, published several advertisements in South Florida newspapers "to recruit Americans for the American Volunteer Group--a branch of our organization."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Frank Solar, "Cuba Raid Foiled by Arrest," Miami Herald, November 14, 1968.

Alfa 66

This has been one of the most active Cuban exile political organizations. The group maintains offices in Miami, New York, Puerto Rico, and several other cities which have large Cuban populations. Alfa 66 has attempted several small-scale invasions of Cuba. They claim responsibility for sinking two Cuban fishing boats and for taking eleven crew members as hostages. A planned prisoner swap with Cuba was rejected by Castro and eventually the hostages were released. Since May of 1970 the activities of Alfa 66 have been minimal because of a very close surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; their offices in Miami were searched during that month and some of their files were confiscated. The Secretary General of the organization was indicted that same month, along with two other leading members of the group, on charges of trafficking stolen weapons.<sup>5</sup> At present Alfa 66 has probably 30 to 40 members.

El Movimiento Insurreccional Revolucionario (MIR)  
(The Insurreccional Revolutionary Movement)  
and Poder Cubano (Cuban Power)

Dr. Orlando Bosch, a Cuban physician, is notorious in Miami for his several encounters with the United States government on account of his anti-Castro activities. He was known, however, to be associated

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<sup>5</sup>Miami Herald, May 29, 1970, p. 1A.

with only one exile organization, the MIR, which aimed at organizing guerillas inside Cuba and staging hit-and-run attacks against the Cuban military and industrial centers. In the month of October of 1968 the United States government disclosed that Bosch was the mysterious "Ernesto," the leader of one of the most militant anti-Castro groups known as Cuban Power. Ernesto held secret news conferences, hooded with a black cape and never identified himself.<sup>6</sup>

Cuban Power has been engaged primarily in terrorist attacks on the property of governments and individuals who trade with Castro. On January 20, they destroyed stored food and medicine destined for Cuba via Mexico at the Miami International Airport. On January 21, a plastic bomb exploded at the door of a transportation agency which was sending parcels to Cuba. The Miami office of the Spanish Tourist Agency and the house of the British Consul were bombed, with Cuban Power claiming credit for the deeds. In August, a bomb damaged a British cargo ship and in September this group admitted to the shelling of a polish freighter docked at the port in Miami. Aside from the 40 bombings that year in Miami,<sup>7</sup> Cuban Power claimed several bombings in New York and Los Angeles.

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<sup>6</sup>Miami Herald, May 25, 1970.

<sup>7</sup>On September 12, 1968, the Miami Herald cited 40 bombings had taken place during the course of the year.

On October 12, Bosch ("Ernesto") and eight of his followers were arrested on charges of attacking the Polish ship. This group, like the other Cuban exile groups, is now greatly hindered in its activities by the United States government's close surveillance. There are now perhaps no more than 30 to 40 members of MIR and Poder Cubano.<sup>8</sup>

In spite of close police scrutiny, there is still some activity by exile groups; however, they are difficult to research because of their clandestine nature.

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<sup>8</sup>Center . . . , Psycho-Social . . . , p. 103, quoting the Miami Herald, Friday, Sept. 1968; Sat., Oct. 19, 1968; Sat., Sept. 14, 1968; Sat., Sept. 21, 1968; Tuesday, Sept. 10, 1968; Mon., Sept. 1968; Tues., Sept. 17, 1968; Sat., Oct. 12, 1968.

## APPENDIX III

### THE REFUGEE PRESS IN MIAMI

Diario Las Américas is an independent newspaper which began publishing sixteen years ago and whose editor is a Nicaraguan, Dr. Horacio Aguirre.

Patria is a twice-weekly whose editor is Armando García Sifredo, a senator under the Batista regime. It published about 15,000 copies on Wednesdays and 28,000 on Fridays. It is the oldest and largest exile publication, strongly pro-Batista and ultra-conservative.

Regreso is an organ of the Association of Cuban Businessmen, Industrialists and Property Owners of Florida. Its editor is Dr. Facundo Hernandez, a former politician. It is a conservative weekly that appears on Saturdays and prints about 10,000 copies.

Replica, which distributes about 14,000 copies Mondays, is the only exile publication that reflects the views of the democratic left. Denounced frequently by Patria, it is as strongly anti-Castro as it is anti-Batista. It is edited by Max Lesnik Menendez, a former student leader and radio commentator who fought the Batista dictatorship and defected to the United States



in 1961.

Crónica is an ultra-conservative but anti-Batista weekly which appears on Thursdays and prints 4,000 copies. It is edited by Ricardo Samitier, a manager of a Cuban cemetery in Miami.

América Libre appears on Thursdays. It maintains a left-of-center anti-Batista line and supports former President Carlos Prío Socarrás. It prints 10,000 copies and its editor is Daniel San Román.

Rece, a centrist monthly publication, is the organ of an organization called the Cuban Representation in Exile, known by its Spanish acronym RECE. The tabloid prints 10,000 copies.

Girón is a non-political monthly, and the organ of the Association of Bay of Pigs Veterans. It distributes some 10,000 copies.

El Nacionalista appears every 10 days or so, and is the mouthpiece of the Cuban Nationalistic Movement, headed by Felipe Rivero Diaz, a small Neo-Nazi group. It prints some 8,000 copies. It advocates the policy of the so-called "Third Position" for Cuba, i.e., neither with the United States, nor with the Soviet Union.

In addition, Miami has also a humor weekly, Zig-Zag, which sells some 20,000 copies.

There are also a number of tabloid publications that do not appear on a regular basis. The

proliferation of the exile press and their apparent longevity is attributed principally to the growth of Cuban businesses and service establishments which find these tabloids an inexpensive advertising mass media.

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